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The Function of Article V  
 
(forthcoming in 163 University of Pennsylvania Law Review – (2014)) 
 
Aziz Z. Huq* 
 
Abstract 
 
What good is Article V? The Constitution’s amendment rule renders the text 
inflexible, countermajoritarian, and insensitive to important contemporary 
constituencies. Comparative empirical studies, moreover, show that textual 
rigidity is not only rare in other countries’ organic documents but highly 
correlated with constitutional failure. To promote our Constitution’s survival and 
to counteract Article V’s ‘dead hand’ effect, commentators argue, Americans 
have turned to informal amendment through the courts or ‘super’ statutes. Article 
V, the conventional wisdom goes, is a dead letter. Against this pervasive 
skepticism, I propose that Article V instead played an important but hitherto 
unrecognized function in the early Republic. Article V mitigated a ‘hold up’ 
dilemma that could have precluded ratification and undermined the new 
Constitution’s stability. By hindering strategic deployment of textual amendment, 
Article V-induced rigidity fostered a virtuous circle of investment in new 
institutions such as political parties and financial infrastructure. Recognition of 
Article V’s role in the early Republic leads to a more nuanced view of the 
Constitution’s amendatory regime. In effect, we have a two-speed Constitution—
with Article V-induced rigidity at the inception supplemented gradually over time 
by informal judicial or statutory amendment protocols.  
 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I am indebted to Anthony Casey, Ros Dixon, Michael Dorf, 
David Fontana, Tom Ginsburg, Mark Graber, David Law, Sanford Levinson, Miguel Schor, and Mila Versteeg for 
their terrific and thoughtful comments and criticisms, as well as to participants in workshops at the University of 
Wisconsin Law School and Drake Law School, who gave useful feedback. Mishan Wroe provided her usual terrfic 
research assistance, for which I am exceedingly grateful. I am also pleased to acknowledge the support of the Frank 
Cicero, Jr. Faculty Fund. All errors, textually entrenched and otherwise, are mine alone. 
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Introduction 
 
What good is Article V? The amendment rule crafted in 1787 renders the Constitution 
one of “the most inflexible” ever written.1 Commentators calumnify Article V for making the 
constitutional text obdurately unresponsive to changing public sentiment.2 Other scholars depict 
the handful of amendments that do pass its gauntlet as excessively nationalist in orientation.3 
Worse, empirical studies of constitutions across the globe find that textual rigidity is highly 
correlated with early constitutional demise. In that light, our Constitution’s “longevity … defies 
expectations.”4 As a result, Article V has become “the constitutional provision … to hate.”5 
Scholarly cottage industries have emerged to explain not only how Americans over time have 
seized upon alternative avenues for constitutional change, such as the Supreme Court,6 
framework statutes,7 and populist “constitutional moments.”8 In effect, scholars have given up on 
                                                 
1 ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 101 (2009) 
[hereinafter Elkins et al., ENDURANCE]; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 49 (2011) (describing the amendment process as “intractable”); 
Rosalind Dixon, Partial Constitutional Amendments, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 643, 645–46 (2011) [hereinafter Dixon, 
Partial Constitutional Amendments] (“Article V imposes some of the most onerous hurdles in the world for the 
ratification of amendments.”); Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 355, 362 (1994) (same). 
2 See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 319, 321 [hereinafter Dixon, 
Updating Constitutional Rules ] (“[C]hanges in social circumstances and understandings over time mean that, from a 
contemporary perspective, a number of core constitutional rules are now no longer optimal.”); Stephen N. Griffen, 
The Nominee Is … Article V, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 51–53 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson, eds., 1998). 
3 See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, Reforming Article V: The Problems Created by the National Convention 
Amendment Method and How to Fix Them, 96 VA. L. REV. 1509, 1513 (2010) (“[T]he constitutional amendment 
method has allowed Congress to promote amendments that accord with its own preferences ….”). 
4 ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 65; Id. at 123 (noting that the United States “do[es] not seem to fit” the 
predictions of comparative analyses of constitutional survival). 
5 John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L. REV., 1929, 1954 (2003); see 
also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappoport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1727 
(2010) (“Article V is almost universally criticized as being too stringent rather than too permissive.”). For a 
particularly sharp version of the critique, see Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee Is … Article V, 12 CONST. 
COMMENT. 171, 173 (1995). 
6 David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 905–15 (1996) [hereinafter 
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation] (arguing for the priority of judicial doctrine over constitutional 
text). The same article makes the point that “legislators and even ordinary citizens, in their encounters with the 
Constitution, act in ways [consistent with a process of incremental constitutional change].” Id. at 925; accord 
Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 9, at 1505 (“The people rule not through discrete, climactic, political acts like 
formal constitutional amendments, but in a different way—often simply through the way they run their nonpolitical 
lives, sometimes combined with sustained political activity spread over a generation or more.”).  
7 See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 1, at 6–9; id. at 12–13 (“America enjoys a constitution of statutes 
supplementing its written Constitution as to the most fundamental features of government.”); see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1218 (2001) (introducing concept). 
8 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 3–31 (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, 
TRANSFORMATIONS] (offering up a theory of “higher lawmaking” to explain extra-textual amendments during 
Reconstruction and the New Deal); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment 
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 459 (1994) (arguing that “Congress would be obliged to call a 
convention to propose revisions [to the Constitution] if a majority of American voters so petition; and that an 
amendment or new constitution could be lawfully ratified by a simple majority of the American electorate”); see 
also Bruce Ackerman, We the People Rise Again, SLATE, June 4, 2012, available at http://hive.slate.com/hive/how-
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2406089 
3 
 
Article V in favor of these substitute modalities of constitutional change. The conventional 
wisdom is, accordingly, that “our system would look the same today if Article V of the 
Constitution had never been adopted and the Constitution contained no provision for formal 
amendment.”9 
 
This Article questions the consensus view of Article V’s irrelevance. Rather than always 
being superfluous, I argue, Article V-induced rigidity played an important, if unacknowledged, 
role in promoting the Constitution’s survival at a key moment in American history—the early 
decades of the Republic. In the antebellum period, textual rigidity mitigated a problem of 
strategic “hold up” by key interest groups. Strategic invocation of the amendment power, I 
suggest, could have precluded the Constitution’s ratification, handicapped the development of 
essential national institutions such as financial infrastructure and political parties, and even 
precipitated secession. By hindering the strategic use of textual amendments, Article V-induced 
rigidity fostered a virtuous circle of investments in new subconstitutional institutions—I offer 
political parties and financial infrastructure as specific examples. At the same time, it deferred 
conflict on highly divisive questions, unresolved in the Constitution’s text, until the Union could 
better withstand the shock of their resolution. Without Article V, therefore, there might be 
eulogies rather than encomia today for the 1787 Constitution. 
 
By contrast, informal amendments of the sort lauded today provide no solution to the 
early Republic’s hold-up problem. In the first decades of the new Republic, after all, neither the 
Court nor Congress played the expansive role that judges and legislators do today in crafting 
workarounds and constraints to non-functioning constitutional rules (even if they were 
extraordinarily creative when it came to developing functional subconstitutional institutions to 
give life to the document’s larger aspirations). To redound to non-Article V mechanisms of 
constitutional amendment to explain the Constitution’s early survival is therefore anachronistic. 
Instead, recognition of Article V’s stabilizing function in the early Republic should lead to a 
more nuanced view of the Constitution’s amendment regime. In effect, we have a ‘two-speed’ 
Constitution: On the one hand, Article V-induced rigidity during the early Republic enabled the 
development of national institutions necessary to anchor the new nation. And on the other hand, 
those very institutions over time created flexibility-generating judicial or statutory amendment 
alternatives in ways that facilitated adaption to changing times and shifting democratic 
preferences. Both formal rigidity and informal flexibility, that is, have contributed to 
constitutional survival—but have done so at different times.  
 
That a constitution survives, of course, is no guarantee that its institutional contents or 
substantive direction are optimal in social welfare terms or desirable on normative grounds. 
Indeed, it is important to note at the outset that my analysis on this Article is oriented toward 
explaining the brute fact of the Constitution’s survival. I do not intend to offer a normative or 
welfarist claim either to the effect that any specific feature of the federal Constitution is 
desirable, or that its continued survival in its observed form to the contemporary period is 
                                                                                                                                                             
can-we-fix-constitution/article/we-the-people-rise-again. A variant on this argument relies on legislative action. See 
Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, supra note 2, at 336–40 (arguing that courts should look sympathetically on 
legislative efforts to update constitutional rules). 
9 David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1459 (2001) 
[hereinafter Strauss, Irrelevance].  
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desirable. Most obviously, the Constitution as originally drafted fell far short of democratic and 
equality ideals by allowing for a limited franchise and accomodating the peculiar institution of 
slavery. Similarly, my argument is orthogonal to the oft-made contemporary plaint that radical 
constitutional reform is desirable, say, on democratic grounds.10     
 
The central task of the Article is to identify and describe the causal mechanism linking 
textual rigidity to constitutional survival in the early Republic. To develop that account, I draw 
on law-and-economics literature about the design of long-term, relational contracts. Many such 
contracts are necessarily “vague or silent on a number of key issues”—much like a 
constitution.11 The literature identifies strategic breach and opportunistic renegotiation as central 
impediments to successful contracting. Recently, scholars have suggested that a written 
contract’s internal resistance to change (e.g., through a no-modification clause) can promote 
efficient, after-the-fact investments by parties and can thereby increase the likelihood of the 
contract’s survival.12  
 
Mutatis mutandi, the same dynamic unfolds in the constitutional context. A constitution’s 
text embodies a deal between powerful national-level interest groups, each of whom can each 
threaten to exit (e.g., by secession) from the deal.13 The drafters, like parties to a private deal, are 
unable to detail fully in the text how all conceivable disputes should be resolved.14 Hence, 
constitutions are inevitably incomplete.15 Once ratified, a necessarily incomplete constitution 
will succeed only if interest groups invest in supplemental national institutions, such as political 
and financial infrastructure, to anchor the new nation. Inevitably, such investments must be 
tailored to a given constitution’s particulars. But this very specificity creates a serious problem.16 
Parties who make such investments lock themselves in to this particular constitution. They thus 
make themselves vulnerable to “hold-ups” by other parties, who can try to expropriate a greater 
share of national wealth through renegotiation of the original deal by textual amendments. A 
strategic hold-up might involve either changing a rule that is in the text already, or addressing a 
question left unresolved by the original text. Either way, proponents of a strategic amendment 
hope to exploit the fact that other parties with post-ratification investments will cede some 
surplus—and hence accept a disfavored amendment—rather than risk constitutional failure and 
                                                 
10 For a cogent argument along these lines, see SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE 
THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). 
11 Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?, 67 ECONOMETRICA 741, 741 (1999). 
12 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J. 
LEG. STUD. 203, 205 (1997) (“Contrary to traditional wisdom, the parties to a contract may be better off if the law 
enables them to tie their hands, or ties their hands for them, in a way that prevents them from taking advantage of 
certain ex post profitable modification opportunities.”). I rely on Jolls not for the specific mechanisms she 
identifies—respecting moral hazard and preference change over time—but on her general insight into the value of 
contractual rigidity. 
13 See, e.g., Daniel Sutter, Enforcing Constitutional Constraints, 8 CONST. POL. ECON. 139 (1997) (analyzing 
constitutions as incomplete contracts); accord Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Incomplete Social Contracts, 1 J. 
EURO. ECON. ASS’N 38, 38–41 (2003). 
14 Tirole, supra note 11, at 741–42 (noting the pervasiveness of contractual incompleteness in political life). 
15 The phrase “incomplete contract” can refer either to (1) obligational incompleteness, where a term (such as price 
or quantity in the ordinary contracting context) is not included, and (2) insufficient state contingency, because of a 
failure to fully realize the potential gains from trade in all future states of the world. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, 
Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 730 (1992). In this 
Article, I mean the phrase “incomplete contracting” to refer to insufficient state contingency.   
16 ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 71. 
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wholesale loss of their constitution-specific investments.17 The shadow of strategic amendment 
threats will undermine a constitution’s chances of getting off the ground. Post-ratification, it can 
also engender inefficient underinvestment and conflict.  
 
Textual rigidity directly mitigates these problems by limiting parties’ ability to engage in 
strategic post-ratification hold-ups.18 To borrow from Albert Hirschman’s famous vocabulary of 
exit, voice, and loyalty, rigidity limits opportunities for voice (i.e., amendment) as a way of 
maintaining loyalty (i.e., investment in new national institutions).19 At the same time, rigidity 
indirectly reduces the likelihood of outright exit through secession. It further facilitates 
“cooperative investment” in new subconstitutional institutions such as political parties and 
banks. Such investments not only enable the realization of welfare gains immanent in the new 
constitutional order,20 but also anchor parties into the constitutional deal by raising the cost of 
exit.21 In effect, Article V encourages all parties to have ‘skin in the game.’ A positive feedback 
mechanism thereby arises, as investment induces confidence, which in turn yields more 
investment; the prospect of exit recedes from sight. The odd fact that the Constitution is 
famously silent about secession is then explained by the fact that Article V itself raises the costs 
of secession, hence making it unattractive.  
 
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I sets forth the conventional view of Article V, 
emphasizing the puzzle of our Constitution’s surprising longevity. The heart of the Article is Part 
II, which identifies and describes a causal link between textual inflexibility and constitutional 
survival. I also furnish here evidence of the mechanism’s operation during the early Republic. 
Part III then identifies and responds to potential objections, elaborates some consequences of the 
foregoing analysis, and then concludes by pointing toward how the analysis supports a “two-
speed” account of the Constitution.  
I. Article V in Constitutional Theory  
 
                                                 
17 The idea of a “hold-up” in contract law is broader than the sense in which I am using the term. See 1A A. CORBIN, 
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 171, at 105 (1963) (using the term to refer to a situation in which a party to a contract, 
through economic duress, forces the other party to agree to a contract modification); see also Steven Shavell, 
Contractual Hold-up and Legal Intervention, 36 J. LEG. STUD. 325, 326–27 (2007) (discussing a range of hold-up 
problems). 
18 This assumes that the constitution is substantively justified. Of course, there may be a “severe conflict between 
constitutionality and justice.” MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 13 
(2006).  
19 To be clear, my argument is distinct from Hirschman’s. His book is in large measure a critique of the perverse 
effects of relying on exit rights, and a description of alternative dynamics, such as one in which “loyalty holds exit at 
bay and activates voice.” ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 78 (1970). The analogies between constitutional commitment and amendment in my 
argument and loyalty and voice in Hirschman’s are suggestive, but hardly exact parallels.  
20 For a development of the concept of a cooperative investment, see Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch, 
Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 125, 126 (1999) (defining a cooperative 
investment as one that “generate[s] a direct benefit for a trading partner”).  
21 The basic intuition here echoes Ernest Young’s observation that there is “a set of political institutions” that do 
“most of our constitutive work [i.e., establishing the various instruments through which governance happens] to … 
outside the Constitution itself.” Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Courts, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 456 
(2007). 
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This Part first describes how Article V works and explores the critiques offered by both 
comparative constitutional scholars and normative theorists. I also explore why informal 
mechanisms of constitutional amendments via judicial decisions or super-statutes cannot explain 
the fact that our Constitution’s longevity “defies expectations.”22  
A. The Mechanics of Article V  
 
Article V of the 1787 Constitution provides: 
 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the 
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for 
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and 
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three 
fourths of the several States or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one 
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that 
no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred 
and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth 
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be 
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.23  
 
Article V thus creates what is basically a two-stage proposal. The first stage (proposal) is done 
either by supermajorities in Congress or among the several states’ legislatures. The second 
(ratification) requires larger supermajorities of the states acting in either legislatures or 
conventions.24 In practice, only Congress proposes amendments, and with one exception, only 
state legislatures do the ratifying.25 The de facto threshold for constitutional amendment, 
therefore, is two-third supermajorities in Congress plus successful votes in 75 state houses 
(assuming one is Nebraska’s unicameral chamber).26  
 
                                                 
22 ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 65 (“There may be good reasons to adopt the Philadelphia model … 
but constitutional endurance is not one of them.”). 
23 U.S. CONST. ART. V. 
24 The states are permitted to determine their own thresholds for ratification. See Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 
1306 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (Stevens, J.).  
25 Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 
YALE L.J. 677, 734 (1993) (noting that no national convention has ever been called); Michael B. Rappaport, The 
Constitutionality of a Limited Convention: An Originalist Analysis, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 53, 60 (2012); see also 
RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION 
126 (1988) (describing the use of state conventions for the Twenty-First Amendment). One consequence is that 
uncertainty lingers about how conventions might work. Compare William W. Van Alystne, Does Article V Restrict 
the States to Calling Unlimited Conventions Only?—A Letter to a Colleague, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1305 
(concluding that limited conventions are constitutional), with Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A 
Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 198 (1972) (taking the opposite view). 
26 One reason for the dominance of the congressional proposal route is its lower transaction costs. Lutz, supra note 
1, at 361–62.  
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The Framers included multiple mechanisms in Article V in response to cross-cutting 
pressures in the Philadelphia Convention.27 Different factions amongst the delegates distrusted 
either the proposed federal government or the several states.28 Delegates also divided “between 
the contending republican faiths of the era, often characterized as Whig versus Federalist.”29 
Whereas Whigs believed “people shared a capacity and a willingness to identify and support the 
best interests of the community,” Federalists “assumed that people’s interests varied and that 
government served as an arbiter between them.”30 To allay fears on all sides, the Convention 
settled on a “compromise” mechanism that allowed either the federal government or state 
institutions to be bypassed entirely.31 Whether Convention members expected that the 
combination of veto gates and voting rules contained in Article V to be especially onerous, 
though, is unclear. On the one hand, the delegates were keenly aware of their own fallibility. On 
June 11, Virginia delegate George Mason warned them that the “plan now to be formed will 
certainly be defective,” and so “[a]mendments therefore will be necessary and it will be better to 
provide then, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust to chance and violence.”32 
On the other hand, recorded votes belie Mason’s concerns. On September 10, for example, the 
Convention voted to reject a ratification requirement of two-thirds of the states and instead 
unanimously endorsed a three-quarters voting rule for ratification.33  
 
In the ensuing ratification debates, partisans for the Constitution nevertheless 
characterized its amendment rule as an optimum. Article V, wrote Madison in the Federalist 43, 
                                                 
27 See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT & AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995, at 55–60 
(1996) (describing debates on amendment procedures at the Philadelphia Convention). The Constitution does not 
provide a voting rule for use by a ratifying state legislature. 
28 On June 11, 1787, George Mason expressed concern that Congress would abuse a power over constitutional 
amendments. 4 THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION 577 (Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987) (quoting 
Mason as saying: “As the proposing of amendments is … to depend … ultimately, on Congress, no amendments of 
the proper kind would ever be obtained by the people, if the Government should become oppressive, as he verily 
believed would be the case”). Alexander Hamilton, by contrast, warned that “[t]he State Legislatures will not apply 
for alternations but with a view to increase their own power.” id.; see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 557–58 (Max Farrand, ed. 1966) [hereinafter 2 FARRAND] (noting Elbridge Gerry’s 
concern that “two-third of the States may obtain a Convention, a majority of which can bind the Union to 
innovations that may subvert the State-Constitutions altogether”); see also KYVIG, supra note 27, at 57 
(summarizing debate between Gerry and Hamilton).  
29 KYVIG, supra note 27, at 61. 
30 Id. at 61–62. 
31 Id. at 60 (“Article V evinced the essential compromise struck between the proponents of a strong central 
government and the advocates of retained state power.”).  
32 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 202–03 (Max Farrand, ed. 1966); see also AKHIL REED 
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 286 (2005) [hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION] 
(describing a concern among the delegates that “an overly stiff amendment mechanism in a governing document 
ultimately doomed the document to irrelevance by inviting outright repudiation”). On the other hand, Philip 
Hamburger has argued that “[i]n 1776, it was assumed that a constitution had to be permanent, in the sense of being 
lasting and even rigid, subject only to alteration by the people.” Philip Hamburger, The Constitution and Social 
Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239, 263 (1989). On this view, only “perfecting” amendments were envisaged by the 
Framers. Id. at 301. Other historians dispute this view. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 613 (1969) (“The American government never pretended … to perfection or to the 
exclusion of future improvements.”). Whoever has the better of the historical argument, the “perfecting” only 
understanding of Article V seems squarely at odds with constitutional practice as it developed.  
33 2 FARRAND, supra note 28, at 555. The vote on the motion for a two-third voting rule was held first, and was 
defeated five-six. Id.  
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was “stamped with every mark of propriety” and “guards equally against the extreme facility that 
would render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate 
its discovered faults.”34 The Madisonian position lingers in some quarters, where Article V is 
still glossed as “a compromise between two competing policies … a sensible mechanism for 
change.”35 The new constitution’s amendment rule also received little attention even in the state 
conventions.36 Only in the Virginia Convention did Patrick Henry’s bleak claim that “the way to 
amendment is, in my conception, shut” stimulate some debate about amendment protocols.37  
 
Article V, then, was a compromise between fundamentally divergent accounts of 
government and human nature. It passed into final, binding organic law attended by relatively 
little scrutiny.38 Its puzzles would ripen only in the fullness of time. 
B. The Puzzle of Article V 
 
 Neither Madison nor Patrick Henry possessed the empirical resources to establish 
whether Article V was, in fact, anomalously rigid or excessively yielding. Only in the last two 
decades have political scientists and legal scholars developed a stock of comparative knowledge 
about how constitutions work that permits the benchmarking of Article V against other 
constitutional amendment rules.39 This section sketches the basic findings of that empirical 
research to show that Article V is, as Patrick Henry complained, unusually rigid. More 
importantly, I emphasize that the document’s survival in light of this rigidity is a puzzle given 
the positive correlation between textual inflexibility and constitutional death—a puzzle that 
cannot be dissolved by recourse to extra-textual modalities of amendment.  
 
                                                 
34 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 284 (Madison) (I. Kramnick, ed. 1987). But, on the other hand, in the final Federalist 
paper, Alexander Hamilton did emphasize the ease of amending pursuant to Article V, and contrasted it to the 
difficulty of “establishing in the first instance, a complete Constitution.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, at 485 
(Hamilton); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 184–85 (Hamilton) (explaining that because the “circumstances 
that endanger the safety of nations are infinite,” then “no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed” on national 
security powers, and thereby suggesting another exogenous motor of constitutional change); THE FEDERALIST NO. 
37, at 243 (J. Madison) (arguing that the Constitution “provide[d] a convenient mode of rectifying … errors, as 
future experience may unfold them”).  
35 Henry Paul Monaghan, We the Peoples, Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. 
REV. 121, 144 (1996); see also Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 374 (1921) (“All amendments must have the sanction 
of the people of the United States, the original fountain of power . . . and ratification by these assemblies in 
threefourths  
of the States shall be taken as a decisive expression of the people’s will and be binding on all.”). Kyvig also insists 
that “in reality the amending process carried out the Founders’ intentions.” KYVIG, supra note 27, at 475. This is an 
especially surprising claim given that Kyvig himself lucidly documents the plural, inconsistent and indeed mutually 
contradictory “intentions” of the various members of the Philadelphia Convention.  
36 According to Pauline Maier’s recent comprehensive study, Article V was either praised (in Massachusetts) or not 
a subject of comment (in New Hampshire, North Carolina, and New York). PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE 
PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION 191, 220, 371 & 419 (2010). 
37 KYVIG, supra note 27, at 78–79. 
38 Cf. Melissa Schwartzberg, The arbitrariness of supermajority rules, 49 SOC. SCI. INFO. 61, 72 (2010) (identifying 
a “lack of reason supporting the supermajoritarian amendment threshold” at the Philadelphia Convention). 
39 Indeed, some argue that this study is still in its infancy. David S. Law, Constitutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 376, 384 (P. Cane & H.M. Kritzer, eds. 2010) (“[W]e know little about the 
conditions under which [constitutional text] succeeds in the sense of either defining practice or improving social 
welfare.”). 
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1. Textual Rigidity and Constitutional Endurance  
 
 From the first major comparative study of why constitutions survive, it has been clear 
that Article V is an outlier. In 1994, political scientist Donald Lutz published a path-marking 
study using data sets covering 50 American states and 32 nations’ constitutions.40 Comparing 
amendment processes on a single numerical scale, Lutz found that “the United States has the 
second-most-difficult amendment process” after the former Yugoslavia.41 The same study also 
analyzed the correlation between the choice of amendment rule and constitutional survival.42 It 
identified a curvilinear relationship between amendment rates and durability, with constitutions 
tending to survive longest if amended at “moderate” rates.43 Reanalysis of the same data, 
however, suggested that the relationship between amendment rate and durability was “very 
weak” and “one can have extremely little confidence in the estimated optimal rate of 
amendment.”44 Lutz’s finding might also be explained by a missing variable in his regressions. 
For example, a country exposed to external military or fiscal shocks may as a result both amend 
its constitution frequently and also repeatedly skirt constitutional death.45 
 
More recent empirical work has addressed these criticisms. The most comprehensive 
effort along these lines is a study based on data about 935 constitutional systems operating 
between 1789 and 2006.46 This study finds “strong evidence” that “formally rigid constitutions 
die more frequently” than flexible ones.47 To identify predictors of constitutional endurance, the 
study’s authors—Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton—construct a multivariate event-history model. 
Their model enables calculation of a baseline estimate of constitutional mortality. It then allows 
for estimates of the effect of diverse endogenous design and exogenous economic and political 
factors to be calculated.48 To address collinearity problems, the study defines “amendment ease” 
by regressing amendment rate “on a set of amendment procedure variables and as well as on a 
host of factors that should predict political reforms.”49 The Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton study is 
presently the gold standard in empirical comparative constitutional analysis. 
                                                 
40 Lutz, supra note 1, at 355. 
41 Id. at 362. 
42 Id. at 360, 362 (Tables 2 & 5). Both tables divide the sample into eight subsamples based on the rate of a 
constitution’s formal amendment, and then shows the average duration of a constitution in that subsample. 
43 Id. at 360, 362. 
44 John Ferejohn, The Politics of Imperfection: The Amendment of Constitutions, 22 L. & SOC. INQ. 501, 522 (1997); 
see also Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative Perspective, 96, 105 (2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1833634 (noting that “for many existing studies [including, 
presumably Lutz’s] the number of independent observations is sufficiently small that there is not enough statistical 
power to pick up the distinct effect of various hurdles to amendment”). 
45 In addition, any effect of an amendment rule on constitutional survival may be confounded by other constitutional 
design decisions. TORSTEN PERSSON & GUIDO TABELLINI, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CONSTITUTIONS 105–12 
(2005) (presenting cross-national data on the effects of these design variables). A further problem is that powerful 
elites may respond to changes in formal institutions by establishing informal regimes that “fully offset” changes in 
de jure power. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions, 98 AM. ECON. 
REV. 267, 287 (2008) (noting that such offsetting is “broadly consistent with a number of historical examples”). 
46 ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 48–51 (describing methodology whereby dataset was constructed). A 
Constitution is defined as a text that is self-identified in its text as a higher law, or that is defined “the basic pattern 
of authority by establishing or suspending an executive or legislative branch of government.” Id.  
47 Id. at 82.  
48 Id. at 129–39 (describing model in detail). 
49 Id. at 101. 
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Consistent with Lutz’s study, Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton find that the U.S. 
Constitution “is scored as one of the most inflexible” ever drafted, scoring a 0.04 on a scale from 
0 to 1.0.50 They further conclude that amendment ease is a “strong predictor of longevity”, 
although its effect is curvilinear, with the very easiest-to-amend documents being especially 
fragile.51 In addition to textual flexibility, Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton conclude that “inclusive 
provisions,” greater textual scope (i.e., more subject-matter coverage), and greater specificity 
promote a constitution’s survival.52  
 
To explain these results, Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton offer a general causal model for 
the life and death of constitutions. They argue that the creation of post-ratification enforcement 
mechanisms is “key” to constitutional survival.53 That is, they emphasize how constitutional 
designers must focus on providing sufficient ‘sticks’ for enforcers in the basic document to 
ensure parties do not shade or defect after ratification. To be sure, Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton 
also briefly touch on the possibility that ‘carrots’ may matter when they talk of ‘locking in’ a 
constitution by “establish[ing] increasing streams of political benefits [that] may be better able to 
withstand external pressures.”54 But this is not their main focus. And as Part II aims to show, it is 
possible that constitutional survival derives from a mechanism that turns less on the prospect of 
punishing defectors and more on the entanglement of contracting parties in positively productive 
relationships. 
 
All three of the factors their empirical analysis highlights as correlates of constitutional 
survival, Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton explain, make enforcement of constitutional rules easier 
by increasing the number of stick-wielders. That is, inclusivity draws into the constitutional 
bargain a larger number of potential enforcers, whose diverse interests are then reflected in an 
increasingly specific text. Similarly, flexibility is desirable because the ease of amendment 
“induces smaller groups to mobilize for constitutional amendment” by giving them a greater 
“stake in the survival of the document,” which can be amended to expand the bargain and 
account for emergent interests and problems.55 In contrast, a terse, inflexible, and under-inclusive 
constitution is likely to sap the incentives for potential enforcers to organize and act for the 
collective good.56  
 
This model yields puzzlement when applied to the U.S. context—as Ginsburg, Elkins, 
and Melton candidly say. “Specificity, inclusion, and flexibility,” they note, are not virtues 
                                                 
50 Id.  
51 ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 140. 
52 Id. at 139, 141.  
53 Id. at 76 (A “key factor in calculus of … breach is the ability of other parties to the bargain to enforce the terms of 
the agreement.”). 
54 Id. at 91. 
55 Id. at 88–89. 
56 Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton describe the initial Constitution as having “low” initial levels of inclusion. Id. at 
163. There is persistent debate on how to gauge the representativeness of the Constitution’s drafting. Compare 
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, at 18, 64–68 (arguing that ratification involved “the widest 
imaginable participation rules” at least “in the eighteenth century,” and also underscoring the democratic pedigree of 
Article I’s franchise rule), with WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 181 
(2007) (noting that “the Framers were, demographically speaking, unrepresentative in the extreme” and “felt the 
need to conceal their intentions” because of this unrepresentativeness).  
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possessed by the 1787 Constitution.57 To the contrary, our Constitution’s longevity “defies 
explanation” on this theory because it “embodies many of the elements that … should lead to 
increased mortality rates.”58 This puzzle, it should also be noted, resists easy dissolution by 
ascribing American national success solely to economic and demographic factors. The analysis 
performed by Ginsburg et al. controls for a host of such non-legal factors and still finds text to be 
a significant influence on constitutional survival. Their work, in order words, is strong counsel 
against the simple expedient of disregarding textual specifications of epiphenomal formalisms. 
To the contrary, the fixed verbal content of constitutional law seems to matter, even if it is not 
exhaustive of all potential causes of regime survival. Assuming that one takes the U.S. 
Constitution as having survived until now59—as both they and I do—there is a puzzle in how to 
reconcile textual rigidity and constitutional survival in the American context.   
 
2. The Informal Amendment Solution 
 
But is there a simple solution to this puzzle? To explain the survival of the U.S. 
Constitution, Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton contend that Article V has been supplemented with 
“informal flexibility…through informal [judicial] interpretation and various bisectional 
compromises.”60 They build here on other scholars’ proposals that formal “constitutional 
amendments have not been an important means of changing the constitutional order” in light of 
alternative, informal means.61 Commentators have thus elaborated Court-centered accounts, 
which point out that once congressional or executive power swells, it is the judiciary that steps in 
to legitimate the change.62 These accounts point to decisions such as McCulloch v. Maryland63 
and Crowell v. Benson64 as instances in which the Supreme Court has de facto ratified 
constitutional transformation.65 Alternatively, Congress-centered accounts of constitutional 
change identify framework “super-statutes” as key vectors of constitutional change those that 
“transform Constitutional baselines,” “create entrenched governance structures and norms,” and 
guide the development of norms otherwise only ambiguously articulated in the textual 
constitution.66 Alternatively, constitutional change can be identified as a series of 
“transformative moments” at which politically mobilized popular movements change the “higher 
law” without changing the constitutional text.67 Given these informal alternatives to Article V, 
                                                 
57 ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 166. 
58 Id. at 65.  
59 One might alternatively argue that the Constitution failed in 1861, and that the post-Civil-War dispensation is 
fundamentally a new one. This view is sufficiently unusual today I do not address it in this Article. 
60 Id. at 177; id. at 163 (“Judicial review (as well as the evolution of popular understandings) has provided a 
mechanism for updating the Constitution, thus ensuring that its allegedly timeless principles are applied to modern 
realities ….”). 
61 Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 9, at 1459; cf. Sanford Levinson, Political Implications of the Amending Clauses, 
13 Const. Comm. 107, 109 (1996) [hereinafter Levinson, Political Implications] (“[I]t is naïve to identify 
‘amendment’ only as formal textual additions (or subtractions).”). 
62 Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 9, at 1467–73. 
63 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
64 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
65 Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 9, at 1473 (invoking both McCulloch and Crowell to make this point). 
66 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 1, at 6–9; id. at 12–13 (“America enjoys a constitution of statutes 
supplementing its written Constitution as to the most fundamental features of government.”). 
67 Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1056-57 (1984). For 
an application of this theory to the Reconstruction, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 142–50 
(1991). Critiques of Ackerman’s theory have refined the account of the specific mechanisms involved in 
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the mystery of our Constitution’s rigidity might seem to explain. Simply put, it is easy to amend 
the Constitution—just not through Article V.  
 
But the puzzle is not so easily dissolved. Alternative mechanisms that rely on legislative 
or judicial action68 cannot explain constitutional survival, particularly in the early Republic, for 
three reasons. First, neither judicial benedictions nor landmark statutes can entirely pick up the 
slack left by Article V-induced rigidity in a way that explains the Constitution’s survival because 
neither is a full substitute for Article V on its own terms. Judicial and legislative mechanisms are 
channels for adding to, not subtracting from, the constitutional fabric. Neither Congress nor the 
courts can easily eliminate undesirable constitutional text.69 Imagine, to use a non-U.S. example, 
an emergency powers provision that destabilizes governments by vesting presidents with power 
to declare unilaterally suspensions of legislative rule.70 Neither legislative nor judicial action can 
do much to resolve the ensuing hazards.71 The limits on informal amendment thus at least hint 
that something more is needed to explain the Constitution’s survival. 
 
Second, legislative and judicial mechanisms for constitutional change outside Article V 
interact with and hinder enforcement via the specificity-based mechanisms identified by 
Ginsburg, Elkins and Melton. Amending outside Article V increases the cost of specificity-based 
constitutional enforcement because it increases uncertainty about what is in the constitution and 
thereby makes it more costly to identify and police violations. Under a regime wherein informal 
                                                                                                                                                             
“transformative.” See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 1045, 1068 (2001) (emphasizing the importance of “[p]artisan entrenchment through presidential appointments 
to the judiciary”); James E. Fleming, We the Unconventional American People, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1537–39 
(1998) (emphasizing the importance of creative acts of judicial review). But see David R. Dow, When Words Mean 
What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1, 40 (1990) (“[T]he bottom line is that if the 
Constitution is to continue to be the ultimate source that protects individual rights against encroachment by 
government power and political majorities, then the affirmative words in Article V must be understood to negative 
other conceivable modes of amendment.”). 
68 For the purposes of this discussion, I treat Ackerman’s theory of controversial moments as a form of constitutional 
change that occurs through legislatures and courts. The populist and political elements of his accounts are 
orthogonal to my point here.  
69 See LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 160 (2006) [hereinafter LEVINSON, OUR 
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION] (“Clever adaptive interpretation is not always possible, however, and Article V has 
made it next to impossible to achieve such adaption where amendment is thought to be a necessity”). This is not to 
say it is impossible to eliminate constitutional text through legislative or judicial action. An example may be the 
treatment of the Republican Form of Government Clause of Article IV. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 
(1849) (finding arguments under that clause nonjusticiable). It might also be argued that the Court once read certain 
rights clauses so narrowly as to sap them of any real meaning. Until District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
(2008), some might have said as much about the Second Amendment. But it would seem more difficult for the Court 
to achieve the same elimination effect respecting much-criticized structural provisions, such as apportionment rules 
for the House and Senate or the Electoral College mechanism. See LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 10, 49–62, 81–97 (developing further criticisms). Congress, however, might be able in some instance to 
develop workarounds. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499 (2000). 
70 A well-known example is Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. RENÉ BRUNET, THE NEW GERMAN 
CONSTITUTION 308 (Joseph Gollomb trans., 1922). 
71 Could an undesirable provision be remedied simply by being ignored? Although there are provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution that have fallen into desuetude, it is worth noting the role that courts have played in stymieing their 
development. See, e.g., Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (treating Guaranty Clause of 
Art. IV as raising only political questions); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (narrow construction of the 
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). In practice, it thus seems that desuetude is enabled 
by judicial intervention.  
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amendment is allowed, violators of an original deal can cloth transgressions in the terminology 
of extra-textual amendment. They can thus seek to obscure self-dealing conduct. Moreover, 
historical experience suggests that doubt will often arise as to whether a non-Article V 
constitutional amendment has even worked.72 This conduces to even more uncertainty about the 
constitution’s content. Finally, the potential for extra-textual amendment undermines potential 
enforcers’ incentive to labor for changes to be memorialized in constitutional text. In all these 
ways, the availability of extra-textual amendment works at cross-purposes to the enforcement 
mechanism envisaged by Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton. This suggests that informal amendment 
mechanisms have complex and partially offsetting effects—undermining some causes of 
constitutional enforcement while contributing to a regime’s durability in other ways. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the key legislative and judicial contributions to 
constitutional development come too late to explain the survival of the 1787 Constitution. As 
Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton persuasively demonstrate, a constitution is at gravest risk of 
demise in the very first two decades of its existence.73 And yet the leading account of our 
“republic of statutes” focuses on such enactments as the Sherman Act of 1890, Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Social Security of 1935.74 With their exception 
of the Sherman Act, these key statutory props of the American constitutional order are twentieth-
century creations.75 The temporal distribution of judicial review is also such that it must be 
rejected as an adequate substitute for Article V at the instant of greatest need.76 Judicial review 
of state or federal statutes was rare prior to the Civil War.77 This should not surprise: The federal 
judiciary developed institutional capacity to hear the volume of cases necessary to play a leading 
role in constitutional development only after the Civil War.78 Consistent with this view, analyses 
                                                 
72 Keith Whittington, From Democratic Dualism to Political Realism: Transforming the Constitution, 10 CONST. 
POL. ECON. 405, 411 (1999) (developing this point in reference to Ackerman’s account of dualist democracy).  
73 ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 120 (noting that constitutions have a “median survival time” of 
nineteen years and that their risk of death peaks at age seventeen).  
74 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 1, 6–24 (providing a general overview of their argument, and mentioning 
these enactments). 
75 Another possible exception concerns what Eskridge and Ferejohn call the “monetary constitution.” Id. at 311. But 
their argument is that “an independent central bank presiding over a national paper currency,” which they view as 
the central and defining element of the monetary constitution, “emerged as a superstatuory framework regime only 
in fits and starts.” Id. at 313. Only with the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 did the framework finally distill. Id. at 333–
39. Thus, even the monetary constitutions fit the temporal pattern they imply in other domains. 
76 Indeed, the leading argument in favor of “the claim about the irrelevance of the amendment process” is explicitly 
offered “in the context of a mature democratic society, not a fledgling constitutional order.” Strauss, Irrelevance, 
supra note 9, at 1460. The mechanism I develop below concerns “how [the constitution] becomes established in the 
first place” and not “how a constitutional system changes.” Id. My argument has a distinct domain from Professor 
Strauss’s. 
77 See Aziz Z. Huq, When was Judicial Self-Restraint?, 100 CAL. L. REV. 579 (2012) [hereinafter Huq, Judicial Self-
Restraint]; see also Mark A. Graber, The New Fiction: Dred Scott and the Language of Judicial Authority, 82 
CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 177, 180–81 (2007) (counting twenty pre-Civil War cases in which the Court imposed 
constitutional limits on congressional power but finding no “judicial tradition, activist or restrained . . . at the time 
when Dred Scott was decided”). In recent years, revisionist accounts of judicial review have sought to identify a 
more robust role for the Court in the early republic. But even self-consciously revisionist accounts marshal only 
weak evidence of judicial activity on constitutional matters in that period. Tom S. Clark & Keith E. Whittington, 
Ideology, Partisanship, and Judicial Review of Acts of Congress, 1789-2006, at 11 available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1475660 (graphing trends in judicial review). 
78 See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties can use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the 
United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. PO. SCI. REV. 511, 512 (2002) (arguing that the “understaffed and unpaid” 
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of antebellum judicial review furnish scant reason to believe courts were an effective substitute 
for Article V change. There are two instances in which the Court invalidated federal statutes 
before the Civil War. In the first instance, the Court struck down an insignificant fragment of the 
1789 Judiciary Act based upon a dubious statutory interpretation.79 That same year, the Court 
ducked confrontation with Congress by allowing the legislature to disestablish existing federal 
courts—starkly illustrating the court’s powerlessness in the teeth of political opposition.80 
Almost sixty years later, the Court once again invalidated a federal law, and this time garnered 
vigorous criticism while failing to check a march to civil war and a concomitant repudiation of 
the Court’s legal reasoning.81 Given this track record, it simply cannot be said that federal courts 
or Congress effectively bore the responsibility of ratifying and enabling fundamental change in 
the early Republic as arguably they do today.  
 
One response to this would be to insist on the constitutional creativity of early 
generations of American politicians. Indeed, it is indupitably true that early legislators viewed 
the Constitution as a central lodestar for their work, as the late David Currie demonstrated in his 
magisterial and extensive history of the Constitution in Congress.82 Moreover, there was no 
wholesale absence of “unconventional adaptation” and “political innovation” through the 
political crises of the early Republic.83 Nevertheless, the most important constitutional crisis of 
the early Republic did produce a (surpassingly rare) constitutional change in the form of the 
Twelve Amendment, rather than some extra-textual shift.84 Further, Currie’s history suggests that 
fidelity to the Constitution limited, rather than expanded, the options from which conscientious 
legislators could choose. Path-dependent institutional legacies from the ensuing decisions should 
thus not be mistaken for conscious efforts at constitutional transformation.85 Indeed, I will argue 
in Part II that much of this institutional back-and-fill should be understood as subconstitutional 
institutional development that was enabled by textual rigidity, rather than constitutional 
transformation that formally demanded a constitutional amendment.86  
 
Only one proposed model of informal constitutional change addresses events during the 
early Republic. It focuses on legislated compromises between Northern and Southern states 
beginning with the 1820 Missouri Compromise and ending with the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act, 
which each promoted “sectional balance” by maintaining the equilibrium between slave and free 
                                                                                                                                                             
judicial infrastructure headed by justices perennially distracted by the travails of riding circuit of 1800 had “become 
by century's end a real third branch of government”). 
79 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
80 See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
81 That case, of course, is Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 363 (1857).  
82 See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801 (1997). 
For a specific example of important legislation in the early Congress with constitutional overtones, see the 
discussion of removal power questions in Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10 & 
n.33 (2013) [hereinafter “Huq. Removal”]. 
83 Joanne Freeman, The Election of 1800: A Study in Political Change, 108 YALE L.J. 1959, 1968-69 (1999). 
84 Id. at 1989. 
85 Ongoing work by my colleague Alison LaCroix on the use of federal spending in the early Republic attests to the 
perceived binding force of the written constitution, and the perceived need for Article V-mediated change to the text 
before the deployment of measures universally viewed as desirable.  
86 It is important to concede though, that the line between constitutional change and subconstitutional institutional 
development is a contestable one, and I do not claim otherwise.  
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states in the Senate.87 Sectional balance legislation, however, was not perceived at the time as 
amending the Constitution. Rather, it was understood as liquidating a principle immanent “from 
the beginning … in the projection of an equal number of new free and slave states in the 
territories in the 1780s.”88 Such legislation evinced loyalty to the original deal. The use of 
sectional balance legislation, therefore, is not evidence of successful amendment, but instead 
evidence that the rigidity and stability of the original constitutional deal played a role in 
promoting constitutional survival.  
 
In sum, informal amendment protocols, whether they rely on judicial decisions, 
framework statutes, or constitutional moments, can provide only a partial explanation of the 
Constitution’s longevity. In particular, they do a poor job of explaining constitutional survival in 
the parlous antebellum period.  
C. The Normative Critique of Article V 
 
The positive puzzle of Article V invites a suite of normative objections to Article V. If 
the latter provision is unusually rigid, then the range of possible amendments will be functionally 
cabined to only “perfecting” measures89 that are relatively inconsequential.90 As a result, many 
commentators condemn Article V as “comatose”91 and functionally “irrelevant.”92 Two lines of 
criticism follow. The first focuses on Article V’s countermajoritarian effect. The second 
condemns Article V’s distributive consequences.  
 
Consider first the countermajoritarian critique. Many commentators claim that, “from 
both a historical and comparative perspective … Article V makes even the proposal of 
amendments by Congress too difficult.”93 Inflexibility imposes the “dead hand”94 of past 
                                                 
87 See Barry Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability, in DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND PUBLIC 
POLICY: ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE 343, 357–58 (Roger D. Congelton & Birgitta Swedenborg, eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability] (arguing that “an additional institution … called sectional 
balance” was needed to provide “a static security for southerns and their property in slaves” (emphasis omitted)); 
ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 83 (adopting sectional balance argument). Weingast’s claim appears to 
be that these laws in effect changed the Constitution by adding a new element to the deal.  
88 Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability, supra note 87, at 357.  
89 Hamburger, supra note 32, at 301. 
90 See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1741 (2007) (“A funny thing happened 
to Americans on the way to the twenty-first century. We have lost our ability to write down our new constitutional 
commitments in the old-fashioned way.”) 
91 Robert G. Dixon, Article V: The Comatose Article of Our Living Constitution?, 66 MICH. L. REV. 931, 931 (1968). 
92 Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 9, at 1459; accord Id? R.G. Dixon, supra note 91, at 932 (arguing that Article V 
has become “little more than a constitutional toy for occasional distract and amusement”). 
93 Dixon, Partial Constitutional Amendments, supra note 1, at 655 accord LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 165 (“Article V constitutes an iron cage with regard to changing some of the most 
important aspects of our constitutional system.”); Griffin, supra note 5, at 173; see also Stephen Holmes, 
Precommitment and the paradox of democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 195 (J. Elster & R. 
Stagstad, eds. 1988) [hereinafter Holmes, Precommitment] (“Why should a constitutional framework, ratified two 
centuries ago, have such enormous power over our lives today?”). 
94 See Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 609 
(2008) (“Th[e] dead hand complaint can be broken into three claims: that it is feasible for the living to depart from 
arrangements indicated by the Constitution; that our generation participated in little of the process responsible for 
the text; and that the Constitution is otherwise imperfect for our time.”); accord McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 
5, at 1730. 
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generations on current preferences.95 The countermajoritarian critique focuses on Article V’s 
supermajoritarian character.96 By demanding extraordinarily large coalitions at both the proposal 
and the ratification stage, Article V endows current minorities with disproportionate power to 
block efforts by supermajoritian coalitions of more than seventy percent of the nation to fix 
perceived constitutional problems. A blocking minority, moreover, may reflect the interests and 
beliefs of a bygone political era that no longer commands majoritarian assent and yet is able to 
maintain disproportionate national influence. Rigidity has immediate costs insofar as it prevents 
correction of what some perceive as unjust or dysfunctional parts of the 1787 Constitution, such 
as the Senate’s apportionment rule, the ill-defined scope of executive power, and the use of life 
tenure for federal judges.97 These concerns have prompted proposals of an extra-textual 
plebiscitary mechanism for fundamental change without supermajoritarian consent.98  
 
‘Dead hand’ criticism need not collapse into wholesale rejection of constitutional 
entrenchment. Even an ardent majoritarian can in good conscience endorse off-the-rack 
governance structures to reduce the transaction costs of governing by eliminating each 
successive generation’s need to recreate basic democratic frameworks.99 She might also endorse 
the 1787 Constitution as an adequate if imperfect “blueprint for democratic governance” in 
which there is some circulation of elective officer-holders and a framework that both reduces the 
risk of defection100 and also “discourage[s] frivolous attempts to revise the Constitution every 
time political deadlock occurs.”101 That is, endorsing majoritarianism is not the same as rejecting 
constitutionalism. Nevertheless, even if some constitutional entrenchment is desirable, Article V 
may still go too far. After all, many other constitutions operate without its extreme rigidity. It is 
hard to see why the United States needs so much more textual rigidity than other countries. 
                                                 
95 See Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional Entrenchment, 29 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251, 251 (1996) (developing objection from democracy to constitutional inflexibility); 
see also Levinson, Political Implications, supra note 61, at 123 (accepting the justification for entrenchment in some 
cases, such as the First Amendment, but also arguing that there are “no good reasons to support the formal status 
engendered by Article V” on other questions). It is important to note that constitutional binding is dissimilar from 
the kind of self-dealing that individuals engage in (with the most famous example being Ulysses tying himself to the 
mast) in as much as the Founding generation and current generations are wholly different entities. See JON ELSTER, 
ULYSSES UNBOUND 92 (2000) [hereinafter ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND]. 
96 Holmes, Precommitment, supra note 93, at 195 (“Why should a minority of our fellow citizens be empowered to 
prevent amendments to the Constitution?”). 
97 See LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 25–158; accord ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW 
DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (2001) (developing arguments from democratic theory against 
current national democratic structures). 
98 See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 8, at 457 (explaining that citizens have a legal right to amend the 
Constitution “via majoritarian and populist mechanism akin to a national referendum, even though that mechanism 
is not explicitly specified in Article V”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the 
Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1988) (arguing for “constitutional amendment by 
direct appeal to, and ratification by, We the People of the United States”). 
99 STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 163 (1995) (comparing 
constitutional rules to grammatical rules, which “do not merely retrain a speaker” but also “allow interlocutors to do 
many thanks they would not otherwise have been able to do or even have thought of doing”). 
100 Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Democratic Constitutionalism: Fixed Rules and Some Implications for 
Contested Presidential Elections, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1985, 1995 (2003); see also Jon Elster, Intertemporal Choice and 
Political Thought, in CHOICE OVER TIME, 35, 38 (Jon Elster & G. Loewenstein, eds., 1992) [hereinafter Elster, 
Intertemporal Choice] (“The purpose of entrenched clauses … is to ensure a reasonable degree of stability in the 
political system and to protect minority rights.”). 
101 HOLMES, supra note 99, at 155. 
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A second line of criticism of Article V identifies a failure to accommodate specific 
constituencies in the amendment process. Hence, Article V is criticized both as being too 
friendly to the several states and as evincing excessive hostility to local interests. On the one 
hand, Article V is condemned for allocating too large a role to the states qua political entities, in 
lieu of reflecting the preferences of citizens on a roughly per capita basis.102 Given the peculiar 
political geography of the United States, this means a “large majority [must] dread and 
sometimes submit to constitutional innovations appealing only to a minority.”103 On the other 
hand, different critics allege that the national convention mechanism for proposing amendments 
is so “broken” that Congress maintains an “effective veto” on constitutional change and uses it 
exclusively to “promote amendments that accord with its own preferences.”104 Another pro-
federalism critique argues Article V is flawed because it creates agency slack between the 
national electorate and its various representatives in federal and state governments.105 On the 
latter view, Congress’s de facto agenda-control over the process of constitutional amendment 
pursuant to Article V may “expand the federal government and increas[e] Congress’s ability to 
extract rents and redistribute wealth.”106 On this view, extensions of the franchise achieved by 
the fifteenth, nineteenth, and twenty-sixth amendment are not occasions for celebration, but are 
to be condemned as efforts to “provid[e] a source of voters [for] the enacting coalition” and 
thereby “increas[e] the likelihood of redistribution of wealth through government.”107  
 
Criticism of Article V, however, is not universal. A handful of commentators claim that 
because the Constitution’s original design was optimal, it makes sense to make formal change as 
costly as possible.108 Taking constitutional perfection yet further, other commentators propose 
                                                 
102 Writing in the early 1960s, Charles Black thus identified and condemned the possibility of a successful 
constitutional amendment being enacted with the support of a bare 40 percent of the nation’s population. See Black, 
supra note 25, at 959. 
103 Id.  
104 Rappaport, supra note 3, at 1512–13. To the extent that this argument is founded on an originalist claim about 
federalism, it is puzzling As Kyvig explains, however, the supermajority rules of Article V already “reflected the 
Founders’ vision of federalism” and the appropriate level of deference to states. KYVIG, supra note 27, at 471. To 
criticize Article V on federalism grounds, Kyvig suggests, is to second-guess the Framers’ calibration of the federal-
state balance. Interestingly, Rappaport goes far beyond the position of the celebrated states’ rights advocate John 
Calhoun, who anticipated that Article V would protect the South from Northern domination up to the point where 
secession would be required. See John C. Calhoun, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United 
States, in A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND A DISCOURSE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 111, 158 (Richard K. Cralle ed., 1968). This again suggests that Rappaport’s baseline conception of 
federalism at work is non-originalist in nature. 
105 Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional 
Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 161–62 (1993).  
106 Id. at 115; id. at 129–30 (arguing that “many of the amendments indirectly facilitated the institutional ability of 
Congress to serve as a source of rents”).  
107 Id. at 143. Boudreaux and Pritchard imply that these expansions of the franchise, which are generally seen as 
normative desirable and indeed long overdue, were in fact welfare-reducing. They thus argue that giving African-
Americans and women the vote “exacerbate[d] the collective-action problem of the electorate generally” by 
“reduc[ing] average voter monitoring of politicians.” Id. at 143. They hence seem to assume that African-Americans 
and women ought always to be have excluded from the electorate—a view I do not share.  
108 See, e.g., Joseph R. Long, Tinkering with the Constitution, 24 YALE L.J. 573, 580, 589 (1915) (“The constitution 
of the United States is justly regarded as the greatest instrument of government ever ordained by man. For more than 
a century it stood almost unchanged….. The present mode of amendment assures its stability while permitting 
natural evolution.”); see also LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINSCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN 
18 
 
that Article V has in fact enabled an effective sorting of good, ratified amendments from 
undesirable, unratified amendments.109  
 
Neither line of defense, however, is successful. Both reason backward from the perceived 
perfection of the original 1787 text and later constitutional amendments. But the original 
constitution contained explicit protections for the slave trade and awarded representational 
subsidies based on states’ possession of slave populations.110 Nor are all subsequent amendments 
equally laudable.111 For example, amendments now hymned for their emancipatory, democracy-
promoting consequences may also have had the perverse collateral effect of strengthening other 
kinds of political exclusion.112 Other amendments now celebrated for rectifying errors in the 
1787 constitution failed for decades to have meaningful effect on the ground.113 It requires a 
pinched field of vision to discern perfection in these outcomes. Nor does the historical pattern of 
failed amendments provide ground for Whiggish enthusiasm. Among the failed amendments 
littering American history are proposals that today would likely be viewed by many as desirable, 
including bans on child labor,114 equal rights for women,115 and the full enfranchisement of 
                                                                                                                                                             
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 164 (2004) (arguing that “the Article V requirements for the amendment of the 
Constitution are an attractive part of the pragmatic justice-seeking quality to our constitutional institutions”); 
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1720 (“[T]he rules for enacting and amending the United States 
Constitution are in large measure desirable.”). These arguments for the Constitution’s optimality rest on the 
epistemic benefits of Article VII’s supermajoritarian character of Article VII, id. at 1096 (invoking Condorcet’s jury 
theorem); and on the idea that Article V’s obduracy prompted the Framers to take into account the interests of 
subsequent generations, Sager, supra, at 164 (“The obduracy of the Constitution to amendment requires of members 
of the ratifying generation that they chose for the Constitution principles and provisions not just for themselves but 
for their children.”). Neither of these arguments is persuasive, even aside from obvious flaws in the 1787 
Constitution. First, it is not clear the demanding conditions for Condorcetian epistemic advantage, in particular the 
assumption of uncorrelated errors, and were in fact met in 1787. See Christian List & Robert E. Goodin, Epistemic 
Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 277, 286 (2001). To the contrary, the 
intensive deliberations around the Constitution undermine any inference that the condition of independent errors was 
satisfied. Cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 30 (2009). And because a 1787 supermajority is 
numerically smaller than a 2012 majority, id. at 11, the Condorcet’s theorem favors the latter and not the former. 
Second, Sager’s argument in favor of Article V assumes that constitutional rigidity induced members of the 
Founding generation to act in a benevolent way, by taking into account the preferences of future generations. But 
Sager does not explain either how the Founding generations could intuit what those preferences would be, or what 
induces a benevolent—as opposed to a condescending or hostile—view of future generations.  
109 This is an argument invoked by scholars at opposite poles of the political spectrum. Compare Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Amending the Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1561, 1564 (1998) (arguing that “most of the ratified 
amendments, by any measure, were desirable revisions”), with McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1724–28 
(lauding Article V on the basis of proposed amendments that have failed).  
110 See DAVID WALDENSTEICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO RATIFICATION 3, 71–105 
(2009) (noting six constitutional clauses that “directly” concern slavery, and five others known by the Framers to 
have important effects on slavery—all but one of which “protect[ed] slavery”). 
111 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1697. 
112 For example, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted in a way that confirmed the exclusion of 
women from the mandatory franchise, and was understood to do so at the time. See Richard M. Re & Christopher 
M. Re, Voting and Vice: Criminal Disenfranchisement and the Reconstruction Amendments, 121 YALE L.J. 1584, 
1612–13 (2012) (discussing enactment history).  
113 Hence, the mere enactment of the Reconstruction Amendments did not redress the compounding effects of 
slavery. For a recent, narrative account of this history see DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: 
THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACKS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2009).  
114 J. Res. 13, 36th Cong., 12 Stat. 251 (1861).  
115 H.R.J. Res. 208, 92nd Cong., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).  
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citizens residing in the District of Columbia.116 It is hardly obvious these measures were “of 
doubtful value,”117 or that the nation was better off upon their defeat. Defenses of Article V 
grounded in constitutional perfectionalism, in short, rest on highly controversial normative and 
empirical judgments.118 They cannot be sustained without implausible assumptions about the 
wisdom of the Founding generation and the precision of Article V as a sorting device.  
 
* * * 
 
Article V, in sum, presents a puzzle. Constitutions tend to survive when they are flexible. 
Yet our Constitution is both among the world’s most rigid and its oldest. This is anomalous and 
calls for explanation. The rigidity of Article V, moreover, generates a suite of trenchant 
normative critiques. To date, its defenders have failed to respond to those charges. They have 
failed to answer Patrick Henry’s question: Why so much rigidity?  
II. The Function of Article V in the Early Republic 
 
 This Part develops an answer to Part I’s puzzle by showing that Article V-induced 
rigidity can foster constitutional longevity. Drawing on recent literature on long-term 
contracting, it identifies two beneficial effects from textual inflexibility that may conduce to 
constitutional survival during the first few decades of a constitution’s existence. First, rigidity 
mitigates a potentially fatal ‘hold-up’ problem that can preclude constitutional ratification and 
discourage vital investments in the institutions needful to make a new constitution work in its 
early decades. Second, the post-ratification investments induced by textual rigidity catalyze a 
virtuous circle, yielding long-term anchoring effects. My aim here is to show that both 
mechanisms are possible in theory and to offer evidence of their operation during the early 
Republic.119  
 
I should clarify at the outset that my claim is not about the original expectations of the 
Framers even though it is focused on the first decades of the Constitution’s existence. I do not 
claim that the Framers envisaged or intended the mechanism limned here. The drafting history of 
the Constitution, and indeed eighteenth-century political science more generally, evinced scant 
grasp of the “difficulties encountered in conceptualizing and modeling incomplete 
contracting.”120 “[R]ealistic and gifted as they were, many of their key assumptions proved to be 
false, and the constitution they created has survived not because of their predictions but in spite 
of them.”121 My claim thus concerns actual not intended effects. To adapt Adam Ferguson’s 
dictum, our Constitution’s survival may be “the result of human action, but not the execution of 
any human design.”122  
 
                                                 
116 H.R.J. Res. 554, 95th Cong. 92 Stat. 3795 (1978).  
117 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1726. 
118 Cf. Henry Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981) (arguing against claims that the 
Constitution supplies solutions to all emergent social problems). 
119 To be clear, my claim is about the value of textual rigidity early in the life of a constitution. As Part III.C 
explains, rigidity is likely substantially less desirable in later periods of constitutional development.  
120 Tirole, supra note 11, at 742. 
121 DAHL, supra note 97, at 141. 
122 ADAM FERGUSON, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 110 (F. Oz-Salzberger, ed. 1995) (1767). 
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This Part begins by explaining why it is appropriate to model the Constitution as an 
incomplete contract. It then introduces relevant concepts and findings from the literature on 
transaction costs in contracting. The central sections of this Part then apply those concepts to the 
constitutional context. My aim in so doing is not to show a precise fit between private-law 
mechanisms and public-law dynamics. Rather, the extensive private law literature serves as a 
launching point for specification of similar—not identical—dynamics in the constitutional 
context. I conclude by offering evidence that the mechanisms described here operated in the 
early Republican context.  
A. The Constitution as a Long-Term Relational Contract 
 
There is a large literature analyzing constitutions as contracts.123 Because it yields at least 
two ways of modeling a constitution as a contract, we can usefully begin by clarifying which sort 
of model this Article will pursue. 
 
1. Two Views of Constitutions as Contracts 
 
First, and most obviously, a constitution can be viewed as a contract between citizens and 
the state. This version of “constitution as contract” is, of course, familiar from normative 
political philosophy. For instance, John Locke famously identified the emergence of a “compact” 
through the agreement of citizens with the aim of “mutual preservation of … lives, liberties, and 
estates.”124 The Lockean view conduces to normative questions about the scope of authority 
delegated to the state and the rights reserved to the people. It is less useful as a heuristic for 
understanding constitutional stability simply because it is not the people per se that pose a threat 
to constitutional stability. With the exception of rare instances of massive popular unrest, it is not 
generally the people as an undifferentiated whole that imperils constitutional survive.125 Rather, 
“[o]rdinary people often play a peripheral role in the breakdown of democracy.”126 A 
heterogeneous and geographically diffuse population will rarely be able to challenge the state in 
                                                 
123 ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 66–72 (making the analogy and drawing on the incomplete 
contracting literature); Stefan Voigt, Constitutional Political Economy: Analyzing Formal Institutions at the Most 
Elementary Level, in NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: A GUIDEBOOK 363, 367–68 (E. Brousseau & J. Glachant, 
eds., 2008); Sutter, supra note 13, at 139; accord Aghion & Bolton, supra note 13, at 38–41. Another line of 
theoretical work focuses on the problems of “self-enforcing constitutions” but takes up essentially the same set of 
concerns and problems. See, e.g., Sonia Mittal & Barry R. Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an 
Application to Democratic Stability in America’s First Century, 28 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 2 (2010); see also Yadeira 
González de Lara, Avner Greif & Saumitra Jha, The Administrative Foundations of Self-Enforcing Constitution, 98 
AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 105, 105 (2008) (describing the rule of law as an example of “equilibria 
with rulers constrained by those ‘administrators’ who implement policies”).  
124 JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, IN TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION 142, 155 (Ian Shapiro, ed., 2003).  
125 Hence, some argue that regimes can be deposed through unmediated popular action. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, 
ON REVOLUTION 38 (rev ed. 2006) (identifying at least the start of the 1789 French revolution with a “multitude on 
the march” … “the multitude of the poor and the downtrodden, who every century had been hidden in darkness and 
shame”). Another example of a populist revolt, less well recalled today, is the French Commune of 1871; for a 
concise history, see ALISTAIR HORNE, THE TERRIBLE YEAR: THE PARIS COMMUNE, 1871 (1971).  
126  NANCY BERMEO, ORDINARY PEOPLE IN EXTRAORDINARY TIMES: THE CITIZENRY AND THE BREAKDOWN OF 
DEMOCRACY 19-20 (2003) (developing the point that “popular defection from democracy is not as common as some 
of the more tragic cases of democratic collapse have led us to believe”) 
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the absence of intermediating institutions such as political parties or ethnic or religious 
organizations.127 Hence, I do not pursue this way of analyzing the Constitution any further.  
 
Instead, this Article builds upon the second model of the constitution as contract. This 
second model focuses not on the relationship between the people and the state, but on 
interactions between the various major interest groups that compete for state power. In this 
model, a written constitution can be understood as a contract between those diverse powerful 
parties—be they states (as in the U.S. context), economically powerful interest groups, or even 
tribes or ethnic groupings—whose cooperation is needful to establishing a long-term cooperative 
relationship and to enable mutually beneficial cooperative action. Because it trains more 
explicitly and directly on the most common causes of constitutional death, this model provides 
the more salient lens for analyzing problems of constitutional survival. Hence, this way of 
modeling constitutions has been employed profitably in explaining how judicial review arose in 
certain Asian countries as a form of “insurance” for both “prospective governing parties” and 
“prospective opposition parties” that alike feared permanent lock-out of government after 
electoral defeat.128 
 
This Article thereafter models the U.S. Constitution as a deal between powerful interest 
groups rather than as the product of popular sovereignty. I take this approach not because the 
latter is normative disreputable or irrelevant but because it does not capture the dynamics most 
relevant to the risk factors for constitutional demise. Moreover, I do not provide a precise 
algorithm for determining which interest groups are salient to the analysis in the U.S. context. It 
suffices here to state that organized groups are relevant insofar as their agreement in an original 
constitutional deal is necessary for an ensuing regime to be resilient against significant shocks. In 
the American context, for example, this obviously includes the thirteen states and likely also 
organized, economically powerful interest groups, such as creditors, merchants, and 
slaveholders.129 Despite the absence of any textual language respecting secession, states de facto 
had the power to threaten exit from the Union, as the events of the 1860s amply show.130 I am 
agnostic as to whether the relevant pool of parties needs to be expanded further, and hence 
disclaim any effort at superfluous precision. Rather, I focus on the question of how the 
Constitution induced stability by encouraging all necessary parties to enter the initial 
constitutional deal and then by dissuading them from exiting in destabilizing ways during the 
acutely vulnerable first two decades of the early Republic.131  
                                                 
127 The basic collective action problem is identified in MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 34 (1965). 
128 TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 25 (2003).  
129 See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
19–51 (rev. ed. 1985) (cataloguing “economic interests” active in the Founding period, and including slaveholders, 
creditors, and the “innumerable manufacturing, shipping, trading, and commercial interests”).  
130 There are independent reasons not to include a textual right of secession. See MIKHAIL FILIPPOV, PETER C. 
ORDESHOOK & OLGA SHVETSOVA, DESIGNING FEDERALISM: A THEORY OF SELF-SUSTAINABLE FEDERAL 
INSTITUTIONS 105 (2004) (“A formally recognized right of secession … legitimates the view that the existing union 
can be dissolved and recreated on new terms ….”). 
131 This model glosses over a number of important difficulties. First, it applies a model of individual precommitment 
to collectivities (such as states and interest groups) that have diverse degrees of internal organization and formal 
decisional capacity. Cf. Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come To It: Some Ambiguities and 
Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1758–60 (2003) [hereinafter Elster, Don’t Burn Your 
Bridge]. Second, it ignores the fact that the composition of a state’s population changes over time, such that a 
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To view the Constitution as a contract is to surface two important qualities. First, a 
constitution qua contract has a long-term, relational quality in that it involves not merely an 
instantaneous exchange of goods (such as one sees on spot markets) but also the making of 
durable cooperative interactions by all parties in order to create a contractual surplus.132 Second, 
the constitution qua contract is incomplete in the sense that the contracting parties have not 
written down contractual solutions to all possible future contingencies.133 Incompleteness arises 
for several reasons. A threshold one relates to the high cost of imagining and resolving all 
possible contingencies in a single document.134 In the constitutional context especially, it is 
impossible for drafters, who have limited time and political capital, to anticipate and to write 
down all possible future states of the world, let alone to provide comprehensive and 
unambiguous governance solutions for all those states of the world.135 Both the “cost of 
processing and using … information” about potential states of the world and “the cost of writing 
a contingent contract in a sufficiently clear and unambiguous way that it can be enforced”136 
ensure that most contracts are in some measure incomplete. Further, even with unlimited time 
and political capital, bounded rationality would prevent drafters from complete specification of a 
constitution as contract.137  
 
The relational quality and the incompleteness of a constitution qua contract are 
intertwined. As the expected duration and complexity of the relations underpinning a constitution 
increase, the costs of writing down ex ante solutions for all future contingencies grows, if only 
                                                                                                                                                             
constitution as contract eventually binds a class of persons who were not alive at the point of contracting. ELSTER, 
ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note 95, at 98. To the extent I am concerned here with the first two generations after the 
Constitution’s ratification, the second difficulty may be mitigated here.  
132 See Melvin Eisenberg, Relational Contracts, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 291, 291–96 (Jack 
Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1994) (discussing possible definitions of “relational contract”); see also Ian 
Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational 
Contract Law, 72 NW. U.L. REV. 854, 856 (1978) (coining the term “relational contract”). 
133 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 299 (2004) [hereinafter SHAVELL, 
FOUNDATIONS] (“An aspect of contractual practice is … is that contracts are significantly incomplete [because they] 
omit all manner of variables and contingencies that are of potential relevance to the contracting parties.”). Tirole 
argues that “there is unfortunately no clear definition of ‘incomplete contracting’ in the literature” but assumes a set 
of restrictions on the standard model of contracts based on unforeseen contingencies, the cost of writing contracts, 
and the cost of enforcing contracts. Tirole, supra note 11, at 743–44. 
134 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 70 (1985) (mapping different governance 
solutions in contracting) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS] (“[F]or long-term contracts executed 
under conditions of uncertainty, complete presentation is apt to be prohibitively costly if not impossible.”); accord 
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 133, at 299; Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of 
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 696 (1986) (hypothesizing “a 
situation in which it is prohibitively difficult to think about and describe unambiguously in advance how all the 
potentially relevant aspects of the production allocation should be chosen as a function of the many states of the 
world”). In addition to the reasons for incompleteness listed in the main text, Shavell also lists enforcement costs 
and the impossibility of judicial verification. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 133, at 300. Because those 
grounds are not relevant to my analysis, I do not address them here further. 
135 WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 70. 
136 Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755, 756 (1988) 
[hereinafter Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation]. 
137 Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, 319, 322 (C. Ménard & 
M.M. Shirley, ed. 2005) [hereinafter Joskow, Vertical Integration]. 
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because the range of contingencies grows as a constitution’s expected lifespan increases.138 A 
basic insight of this contracting literature therefore is that there is a “trade-off between rigidity 
and flexibility” analogous to the one that exists in constitutional design between the benefits of 
specification and the gains from adaption.139  
 
2. The Hold-up Problem in Private Contracting  
 
A large law-and-economics literature about barriers to contracting developed in the wake 
of Ronald Coase’s famous article asking why contracting parties opt to internalize a transaction 
within a firm rather than using the market.140 Coase’s analysis identified a comparison of the 
marginal “costs of organizing” production inside and outside the firm as pivotal to this 
decision.141 When the costs of organizing through market mechanisms are relatively high, it is 
worth fashioning a long-term and relational incomplete contract—i.e., the firm. Coase’s insight 
generated a range of hypotheses about how incomplete, relational contracts can be designed to 
address problems specifics to particular industries and parties.142 His analysis pointed toward 
different ways in which contracts could respond to heterogeneous barriers to contracting,143 
including adverse selection problems, information asymmetries,144 and the need for high-
powered rather than low-powered incentives to make a contract succeed.145  
 
One kind of private contracting problem has special relevance for understanding the role 
of textual rigidity in ‘constitutions qua contracts.’ It is the problem of “hold-ups,”146 otherwise 
known as the problem of “post-contractual opportunist behavior.”147 Hold-up problems can arise 
whenever parties must make post-contractual investments in assets specific to their 
relationship.148 An investment-backed asset is specific when a contracting party’s next-best 
return from the asset is substantially less than the return from the asset within the context of the 
                                                 
138 Some commentators go so far as to define relational contracts in terms of their incompleteness. See, e.g., Charles 
Goetz & Robert Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1981) (“A contract is 
relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined 
obligations.”). 
139 Compare Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q. J. ECON. 1, 2 (2008) [hereinafter 
Hart & Moore, Contracts as Reference Points], with Elster, Intertemporal Choice, supra note 100, at 43 (identifying 
the need to find “an optimal balance between stability and rigidity” in constitutional design); accord Ferejohn, supra 
note 40, at 502.  
140 RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 1–31 (1988).  
141 Id. at 31. 
142 See Pierre Garrouste & Stéphane Saussier, The Theories of the Firm, in BROUSSEAU & GLACHANT, supra note 
123, at 23, 24 (exploring the “competing theories of the firm” developed after Coase); WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 79, fig. 3.2. 
143 For an early survey, see Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure 
Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 114–22 (1971) (listing four species of market failures that “involve 
transaction costs that can be attenuated by substituting internal organization and market exchange”). 
144 WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 81–83. 
145 Garrouste & Saussier, supra note 142, at 28.  
146 SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 133, at 326–27 (discussing a range of hold-up problems); see also Victor P. 
Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCI. 626, 439–41 (1976) 
(describing hold up problem as one or providing protection for the “right to be served”). 
147 Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the 
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978).  
148 Joskow, Vertical Integration, supra note 137, at 322. Williamson uses the phrase “asset specificity.” 
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 52–54.  
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contractual relationship.149 Imagine a printing press built with specifications for a particular 
newspaper that generates a joint annual surplus of $1.5 million, where the next-best use of the 
press (for a different publisher with distinctive and different needs) would yield only 
$500,000.150 Once the press has made its investment, the newspaper can threaten to breach in 
order to extort a greater share of the jointly produced surplus from the investing party.151 
Because the second-best use of the asset pays out much less to the investing party, the latter 
stands to realize a large loss by walking away from the contract. Accordingly, it is rational to 
accede to renegotiation.152 Even when the dependency is bilateral, the possibility of hold-up can 
still lead to haggling that dissipates the gains from trade.153  
 
The potential for hold-up has both ex ante and ex post effects. Ex ante, a potential 
investing party will rationally anticipate the possibility of hold-up and so decline to enter into 
contracts where that risk exists.154 Otherwise Pareto-superior deals will, as a result, remain 
unrealized. Ex post, parties that do enter deals will dissipate resources on both hold-ups and 
resistance to hold-ups, resulting in intracontractual disputes and haggling that expend resources 
without commensurate social gain.155 Solving the hold-up problem is valuable, therefore, 
because it enables otherwise Pareto-superior deals to be negotiated and honored in ways that 
maximize their value. 
 
The relationship-specificity of assets created by post-contractual investment and the 
consequent specter of a hold-up can be observed across the landscape of private contracting.156 
Consider, for example, a coal-burning power generation facility that benefits from being located 
at the “mouth” of a mine, but that thereby renders itself vulnerable to hold-up.157 Or think of an 
automobile manufacturer that may wish for a subsidiary supplier to invest in specialized 
manufacturing hardware, and even to co-locate, in order to minimize production costs, only to 
                                                 
149 See Joskow, Vertical Integration, supra note 137, at 322 (“[R]elationship-specific investments are investments 
which, once made, have a value in alternative uses that is less than the value in the use originally intended to support 
a particular trading relationship”). 
150 The now somewhat antiquated example is loosely adapted from Klein et al., supra note 147, at 300. 
151 Another way of stating the problem is that “one party to a contract agrees to a proposed modification either 
because of expected dire consequences should that party not agree to the modification or because the available 
remedies for breach by the other party are inadequate to deter breach by the other party.” Daniel A. Graham & Ellen 
R. Pierce, Contract Modification: An Economic Analysis of the Hold-Up Game, 52 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 9 
(1989). The potential breaching party, Williamson argues, is distinct from an ordinary contracting party in that she 
acts with “self-interest seeking with guile.” WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 47.  
152 I assume here a one-shot interaction. Repeat-play circumstances may render other strategies rational.  
153 Joskow, Vertical Integration, supra note 137, at 327. 
154 Jolls, supra note 12, at 208. 
155 Id.; see also Klein et al., supra note 147, at 301 (“Even if transactors are risk neutral, the presence of possible 
opportunistic behavior will entail costs as real resources are devoted to the attempt to improve posttransaction 
bargaining positions in the event … opportunism occurs.”).  
156 See Victor P. Goldberg, Relational exchange: Economics and complex contracts, in READINGS IN THE 
ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS 16, 16 (Victor P. Goldberg, ed., 1989) (“Much economic activity takes place within 
long-term, complex, perhaps multiparty contractual (or contract-like) relationships; behavior is, in varying degrees, 
sheltered from market forces.”).  
157 See Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning. Electric 
Generating Stations, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 33 (1985). 
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find that the supplier baulks out of a fear of hold-up.158 It is even possible to find hold-ups in 
contracts over human capital. A famous example involves the tough bargaining by actor James 
Gandolfini over whether he would appear in later seasons of the lucrative HBO series The 
Sopranos, which resulted in the actor roughly doubling his $400,000 per episode salary—the 
network being the object of the hold-up.159 As these examples suggest, an investment’s 
specificity can take many forms, from location to physical design or human capital allocations.160 
The hold-up problem may be also especially acute in circumstances in which a post-contract-
formation investment is cooperative in nature in that it “generate[s] a direct benefit for the 
trading partner.161 Such cooperative investments are “critically important in modern 
manufacturing.”162 Empirical studies confirm that the hold-up problem is not merely 
hypothetical, but has significant cost-efficiency effects in contracting.163  
 
Hold-up problems arise in both incomplete and complete contracts, albeit in different 
ways. Hold-up can arise either when an incomplete contract does not address an unexpected 
exogenous event that provokes one party to seek renegotiation or when post-contracting 
investments expose one party to others’ opportunism. With a complete contract, changed 
circumstances can also lead to hold-up.164 For instance, Gandolfini’s contract was likely 
complete in the sense that it specified a salary.165 The latter dispute can hence be described either 
in terms of an incomplete or a complete contract: It either concerned the breach of a complete 
contract followed by de novo deal-making (from HBO’s perspective), or the modification of an 
incomplete contract that did not state when modifications were permitted (from Gandolfini’s 
view). The problem can accordingly be framed either as one of contractual commitment or gap-
filling. For the purposes of this Article, there is little need to distinguish between these two 
characterizations, even if the distinction has significance in the private contracting context. 
 
There are several ways of mitigating the potential for hold-ups, not all of which translate 
well into the public-law context. Among the first solutions to be identified in the law-and-
economics literature involved vertical integration. One firm would purchase the other and 
thereby eliminate the possibility of interfirm hold-up.166 Arranging deals within the firm, 
                                                 
158 Klein et al., supra note 147, at 308–10 (discussing the purchase of Fisher Body by General Motors). For an 
important challenge to the conventional account of this purchase, see Douglas Baird, In Coase’s Footsteps, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 23, 30–31 (2003) (arguing that “the integration of Fisher and Chevrolet took place before acquisition. 
GM's acquisition of Fisher Body in 1926 was not the main event [and] the acquisition may have had almost no effect 
on the way in which Chevrolet interacted with Fisher at the plant level”). 
159 SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS supra note 133, at 328. 
160 WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 95–96. 
161 See Che & Hausch, supra note 20, at 125–26; cf. Tirole, supra note 11, at 747 (“Roughly speaking, an investment 
is cooperative if it affects the trading partner’s surplus more than the investing partner’s surplus.”).  
162 Che & Hausch, supra note 20, at 127 (giving examples). 
163 One study of a large naval construction contract found that “overall organization costs represent about 14 percent 
of the total costs of the components and activities” studied. Scott E. Masten, James W. Meehan, Jr., & Edward A. 
Snyder, The Costs of Organization, 7 J. L. & ECON. 1, 2, 20–21 (1991).  
164 For an analysis that identifies the need for mechanisms to generate enduring commitments even in the absence of 
incompleteness, see Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. 
ECON. REV. 519, 537–38 (1983). 
165 The cases discussed infra in text accompanying note 177 might also characterized as concerning complete 
contracts. 
166 The seminal paper in this literature is Oliver Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of 
Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 233 (1979). For development of the idea, see WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC 
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although it mitigates the hold-up problem, is not costless. Rather, it “sacrifices the high-powered 
incentive advantages of market exchange and, consequently, demands greater investments in 
monitoring and administration.”167 Some evidence nevertheless suggests that integration 
“becomes more likely in the presence of relationship-specific human capital.”168 However 
promising as a private-law solution, vertical integration cannot be transposed easily to the public-
law context. A constitution cannot by mere ipse dixit dissolve a diverse and conflictive pool of 
interest groups into a harmonious whole.  
 
A second possible solution is to draft the contract to include various complex 
mechanisms that dampen renegotiation.169 For example, a leading analysis postulates that 
mechanisms for verifiable communication between parties in some circumstances will enable the 
maintenance of efficient investment levels.170 Like vertical integration, the specific contractual 
solutions proposed in this line of analysis do not translate easily into the context of constitutions 
as contract.171 An exception is the possibility of “offering to the potential cheater a future 
‘premium,’ more precisely, a price sufficiently greater than average variable (that is, avoidable) 
cost to assert a quasi-rent stream that will exceed the potential gain from cheating.”172 Examples 
of the latter mechanism include long-term implicit contracts with particular suppliers and 
interfirm reciprocity agreements, both of which create an enduring stream of benefits the present-
discounted value of which is greater than the benefits from cheating.173 As explained below, 
something akin to this mechanism might be discerned in the American constitutional context, 
although there are easier ways of modeling the solution found in the public-law context. 
 
 The third solution to hold-ups explored in the private-law literature does, however, bear 
directly on public law problems. Indeed, this solution may paradoxically be easier to employ in 
the public-law context than in the private-law context. This is the possibility of declining to 
                                                                                                                                                             
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 90; Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A 
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 695 (1986) (exploring vertical integration and 
explaining that “the owner of the asset” is defined as the party with “the right to control all aspects of the asset that 
have not been explicitly given away by contract”); accord Klein et al., supra note 147, at 302–07. Notice that the 
hold-up problem is not necessarily solved by vertical integration, but displaced: It will sometimes be the case that 
the purchased firms managers have unique knowledge, and can therefore engage in a hold up of the purchasing firms 
management. Id. at 302–03.  
167 Masten et al., supra note 163, at 6. 
168 Id. at 21. 
169 For a survey of potential solutions in the contract literature, see Richard Holden & Anup Malani, Contracts 
versus Assets and the Boundary of the Firm (draft Jan, 2012) (on file with author); see also, e.g., Aaron Edlin & 
Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 478 (1996); 
Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 Rev. Econ. 
Stud. 473 (1992). Maximizing efficiency may also be framed as a question of determining “the optimal ownership 
structure ... to minimize the overall loss in surplus due to investment distortions.” Grossman & Hart, supra note 166, 
at 710.  
170 Hart & Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, supra note 136, at 776 (but also noting that this solution 
is not available if parties are risk neutral).  
171 Independently, Shavell notes that “the use of contractually specified mechanisms does not appear to be very 
important in reality,” although no evidence is supplied on this point. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 133, at 
348. 
172 Klein et al., supra note 147, at 304. 
173 Id. at 304–05. 
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enforce modifications to a contract.174 After two parties sign a contract that requires relationship-
specific investments on the part of Party A, that is, a court asked to enforce a modification of the 
contract elicited by Party B will demur, and instead enforce the terms of the contract as 
originally drafted. A rule against modification of this kind “assures prospective contract parties 
that signing a contract is not stepping into a trap” and so enables Pareto-superior deals.175  
 
In practice, the effect of no-modification clauses pursuant to American contract law is 
unclear. The “pre-existing duty rule” sometimes has the effect of barring certain sorts of 
modifications, and hence mitigates certain hold-up problems.176 For example, in the case-book 
staple of Alaska Packers’ Association v. Domenico, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declined 
to enforce a salary-increasing modification negotiated by the crew of a fishing vessel in the midst 
of an Alaska salmon run, at a time at which no substitute crew could possibly be found.177  
 
In other instances, though, “courts simply ignor[e] the pre-existing duty rule” or find 
ways to circumvent it.178 “Freedom of contract” principles are often cited as ground for such 
refusals.179 Even more problematic is the fact that “[t]hose who make a contract, may unmake 
it…. Whenever two men contract, no limitation self-imposed can destroy their power to contract 
again.”180 In other words, there is a generally available mechanism for the rendering no-
modification clauses nugatory—which is to enter into a side-contract that counteracts the terms 
of a chronologically earlier contract.181 These difficulties have provoked arguments in favor of 
adopting a more formal rule in favor of the “enforcement of contractual terms constraining 
modifications.”182  
 
If no-modification clauses resolve a hold-up problem that can arise in private law 
contracting (both for incomplete and complete contracts), can they be employed to address 
analog concerns in the public law context? An alternative answer is developed in the next 
                                                 
174 SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 133, at 332–33 (“Legal intervention to prevent price from exceeding the 
optimal price would in principle be desirable ….”); Graham & Pierce, supra note 151, at 9–10 (noting the risk of 
holdup as a justification for judicial nonenforcement of a contract). For early treatments of the possibility, see 
Varouj A. Aivazian, Michael J. Trebilcock, & Michael Penny, The Law of Contract of Modifications: The Uncertain 
Quest for a Bench Mark of Enforceability, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 173 (1984); Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic 
Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981).  
175 Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.). 
176 See CORBIN, supra note 17, at §171, at 105 (“[N]either the performance of a duty nor the promise to render a 
performance already required by duty is sufficient consideration for a return promise.”). The Uniform Commerce 
Code allows good faith modifications. U.C.C. §2-209(1) & cmt. 1 (1987). 
177 Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902); see also LingenfeldeGr v. Wainwright Brewing 
Co., 103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 44 (1891); Rose v. Daniels, 8 R.I. 381 (1866). Other examples of pre-existing duty rules 
include price-regulation statutes, see SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 133, at 343, admiralty rules for salvage, 
see Post v. Jones, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 150 (1856), and utility regulations, see Goldberg, supra note 156, at 426. Since 
Alaska Packers concerned a fixed term (salary), it might be characterized as a case about enforcement simpliciter. 
But note that from the crew’s perspective, the case concerned an incomplete term—specifically the conditions for 
modification. 
178 Graham & Peirce, supra note 151, at 15. 
179 For an exemplary statement of freedom of contracting, see, e.g., Continental Basketball Ass'n, Inc. v. Ellenstein 
Enters., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 134, 139 (Ind. 1996).  
180 Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 278, 387–88 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo, J.). 
181 Jolls observes that it is possible in some contexts to prevent side-contracting. Jolls, supra note 12, at 230–31.  
182 Id. at 236. 
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section. But as a threshold matter, notice a key difference between private and public law 
contexts. In the private law context, courts are unwilling to enforce no-modification clauses and 
it is hard to prevent parties contracting around the clause via a new, offsetting contract. But a 
defining feature of the constitutional context is the absence of effective third-party 
enforcement.183 Supreme Courts and their ilk, after all, are “the product of constitutional 
negotiation,” not extrinsic to the constitutional order.184 It is the parties themselves who must 
necessarily make the decision whether or not to comply with a constitution, seek amendment, or 
withdraw. Unlike in the private-law context, no-modification clauses in the public law context 
can effectively take an option (modification) off the table. The parties are effectively moved by 
such a clause from a three-option situation (adhere to the contract, modify, or exit) to a two-
option world (adherence or exit). As a consequence, the reasons that no-modification clauses are 
not more commonly employed in the private-law context do not translate well into the public-law 
domain. 
 
It is also worth noting that no-modification clauses in private contracts are perceived as 
having nontrivial collateral costs. An across-the-board rule of contractual inflexibility might have 
benefits but it also impedes otherwise warranted adjustments in light of changed circumstances. 
Proposals to enforce no-modification rules as a result often suggest an exception for contractual 
responses to unanticipated and exogenous changes in background circumstances.185 Some long-
term contracts already attempt to draw a distinction between desirable and undesirable 
modifications. For example, “prime plus” clauses in loan agreements and “price protection” 
clauses with pari passu effect in supply contracts in effect operate as sorting devices to allow 
some desirable forms of change, but not undesirable change motivated by hold-ups.186  
 
In sum, an extensive literature concerning private contracting has identified a spectrum of 
transaction costs that impede the formation or consummate execution of durational contracts. An 
important strand of that literature identifies hold-up as a risk: the exploitation of parties who 
have invested in relationship-specific assets that lock them into a contract. Among the solutions 
offered in the literature is the possibility of no-modification clauses. While there are reasons 
these are not (yet) common in ordinary contracting, those reasons do not translate well into the 
public law context.  
B. The Role of Textual Rigidity in Promoting Constitutional Survival  
 
 The foregoing discussion sets the stage for an account of the causal mechanism linking 
constitutional rigidity to constitutional survival. Succinctly stated, the mechanism works as 
follows: In conditions in which cooperative investments are pivotal to the survival of a novel 
constitution order, a well-crafted constitution might plausible be written with an onerous 
amendment rule akin to Article V. This amendatory provision operates much like a no-
modification rule in ordinary contracting: It switches the parties’ choice set from three options—
adhere to the contract, modify, or exit—to two—adherence or exit. This change elicits parties 
                                                 
183 Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge, supra note 131, at 1759–60. 
184 ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 72. 
185 Jolls, supra note 12, at 228–30. 
186 Klein et al., supra note 147, at 317 (giving examples). 
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entrance to the constitution as contract ex ante, and then renders more likely cooperative 
investments that otherwise would be put on hold or rationed for fear of hold-ups.  
 
We can take the analysis one step further. Notice that textual rigidity takes the ‘modify’ 
option off the table but not the ‘exit’ option. Indeed, as in the private law context, it is hard to see 
how the exit option could be effectively eliminated absent the use of violence or coercion. And 
yet, even in the absence of coercion, it is possible that textual rigidity may also mitigate the risk 
of outright exit from the constitutional order. Rigidity indirectly addresses the risk of exit by 
eliciting cooperative investments from multiple parties toward the creation of new institutions 
tied to a new constitution. The costs sunk by those parties into cooperatively produced 
institutions have the effect of raising the stakes of departure for any of the parties. By making 
exit more costly, rigidity makes it less likely. Threats of defection also become less credible. The 
overall effect of textual rigidity is not just to address fears of midstream hold-up by opportunistic 
contracting partners, that is, but also to elicit an entangling web of mutually beneficial 
cooperative investments that enmesh all parties into a specific constitutional regime.  
 
I analyze this causal mechanism in its two stages. First, I look more closely at the link 
between constitutional rigidity and the hold-up problem. In the course of the argument, I point to 
evidence that this mechanism operated in the early American republic. Second, I look at the link 
between entangling institutions and constitutional survival. Again, I offer examples of specific 
institutions that may have played this role in the decades immediately after ratification, which is 
when rigidity has greatest utility.  
 
1. The Preconditions for Constitutional No-Modification Rules  
 
 If textual rigidity can mitigate the risk of ex ante failure to enter a Pareto-superior private 
contract and the ex post underinvestment in the coproduction of goods under the contract, might 
the same mechanism work at the constitutional level? A threshold step in answering this question 
is to identify the circumstances under which hold-up is likely to be a problem, and to ascertain 
whether the U.S. Constitution falls within this class of cases.  
 
The problem of hold-up is likely to arise only when two preconditions are met: 
oligopolistic political competition and a thin national institutional infrastructure. First, 
constitutions installed in the absence of political competition pose no such concern. Thus, a 
constitution imposed by dint of external military force,187 or by a single monopolistic political 
party,188 need not be drafted with the risk of hold-up in mind. Second, drafters may rightly be 
less concerned about hold-up when robust national institutions already exist because the latter 
vitiate the need for new, post-ratification cooperative investments.189 Given these possibilities, 
not every founding father or mother should be worried about the hold-ups problem. And in many 
constitution-making contexts, it will be quite likely that either one or the other of these 
preconditions for textual rigidity will not be met. Indeed, the absence of other rigid, long-lasting 
constitutions that has been identified by Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton suggests that these two 
conditions are rarely both satisfied.  
                                                 
187 Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857 (2003). 
188 ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 173–74. 
189 The Constitutions of the French Fourth and Fifth Republics likely fall into this class. Id. at 170–71. 
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The period of the drafting and ratification of the U.S. Constitution, however, was 
characterized by both oligopolistic political competition and a thin national institutional 
infrastructure. First, the coalition in favor of more robust federal action viewed the several states 
as not merely potential but actual spoilers of the cooperative enterprise of maintaining 
independence from European domination and achieving economic flourishing.190 Prior to the 
Philadelphia Convention, states had notoriously declined to accede to the Confederation 
Congress’s fiscal and military requests despite the grave financial strains imposed by the 
Revolutionary War.191 As early as 1782, Rhode Island had signaled that it would decline to ratify 
a proposed five percent impost on imported goods.192 In 1786, New Jersey and New York also 
indicated their unwillingness to continue contributions to the confederated fisc.193 Internal 
divisions in Congress also induced an “inability” on the national legislature’s part “to frame and 
implement satisfactory foreign policies,” leaving states vulnerable to the maneuvers of European 
great powers.194  
 
A concern with states as potential spoilers was also reflected in the concessions made 
during drafting and ratification to states that were implicitly or explicitly threatening exit from 
the federal project. During the Philadelphia Convention, for example, small states resisted any 
deviation from the Articles of Confederation rule of equal representation for each state.195 One 
result of this pressure was the “Great Compromise,” involving different apportionment rules for 
the federal House and the Senate.196 During ratification, the Constitution’s supporters also 
evinced concern that pivotal states would decline to accede to the new document, imperiling the 
entire exercise.197 That these concerns were powerful enough to alter the views of Madison and 
others on a bill of rights suggests that the Framers’ concerns about defection from the national 
process were substantial.198  
 
The Framers’ obvious grounds for concern about states’ exit from the Constitution 
creates a puzzle: Why did they not expressly bar secession in the text of the Constitution? Not 
only was the Constitution silent on that point, but through the antebellum period there was a 
                                                 
190 A concern with hold-up also implies some stable identification of group interest, such as a system of states (as in 
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191 See JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 25 (1996) 
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193 Id. at 31–32. 
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“lively and inconclusive debate over whether the Constitution permitted states to secede.”199 The 
argument developed in the balance of this Part offers a reason for this silence: The Framers did 
not typically rely on “parchment” prohibitions to attain structural design goals.200 Instead, they 
relied on clever institutional design to cultivate appropriate incentives and to produce stable 
equilibrium. Reliance on textual rigidity to deter secession coheres with the indirect, structural 
strategies deployed elsewhere in the Constitution to mitigate systemic risks.  
 
 Second, the several states as of 1787 were hardly equipped with robust national 
institutions of the kind seen in Europe. To the contrary, a central aim of the new Constitution 
was the creation of national institutions backed by cooperative investments that would 
effectively produce much-needed public goods. Hence, in describing the impulse for a new 
constitutional framework James Madison diagnosed in the pre-1787 confederation a “want of 
concert in matters where common interest requires it … [a] defect . . . strongly illustrated in the 
state of our commercial affairs,” a lacuna he attributed to “the perverseness of particular States 
whose commerce is necessary.”201 States’ opportunism, Madison suggested, induced a dearth of 
cooperative investments in national institutions with public-good characteristics.  
 
Consistent with Madison’s concerns, the Philadelphia Convention opened with the 
“recogn[ition] that the actions of individually rational states produced irrational results for the 
nation as a whole.”202 Recalcitrance of the states, as noted above, had already imperiled the 
nascent union. During the Revolutionary War, the requisitions system through which the 
Continental Congress funded military efforts sometimes yielded only 37 percent of the monies 
sought,203 with compliance dropping at moments to 12 percent with hostilities’ end.204 The 
confederation’s ongoing inability to service foreign and domestic debts also posed a direct risk to 
sovereignty, since it rendered the national government incapable of responding to great power 
threats, exemplified by Spain’s closure of the Mississippi River and New Orleans, or foreign 
policy irritants, such as the Barbary pirates.205 These failures made the case for new national 
institutions all the more compelling. 
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In this context, the Philadelphia Convention drafted a constitution that, unlike the Articles 
of Confederation, would elicit cooperative investments from the states to build new national 
institutions with a public-good aspect such as “military defense,” “a unified market for goods, 
capital, and labor,”206 a new system for federal taxation, a new national military capacity, and a 
new national financial system.207 Mindful of the Articles’ failure to elicit these goods, the 
Convention instructed the Committee of Detail to allow the power “to legislate in all Cases for 
the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the States are separately 
incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of 
individual Legislation.”208 Taking these steps, the Framers anticipated that states would reap 
benefits an order of magnitude larger than their original contributions through the fostering a 
wide array of new institutions.  
 
In sum, both preconditions for textual rigidity—oligopolistic political competition and 
infrastructural fragility—were present at the U.S. Founding. This distinct and perhaps rare 
combination of circumstances explains why textual rigidity may have been the right approach to 
the problem of stabilizing the U.S. Constitution. 
 
2. Textual Rigidity as a Response to the Strategic Threat of Amendment  
 
 How then did textual rigidity respond to the drafting problems that faced the 
Constitution’s drafters? The mechanism has two elements. First, rigidity promotes constitution-
specific investments by reducing the threat of specific employment of the amendment power. 
Second, those investments in turn locked in participants to the Constitution by making secession 
more costly. To invoke Albert Hirschman’s terminology again, limiting the strategic use of 
‘voice’ conduces to ‘loyalty,’ and then the prolonged exercise of ‘loyalty’ raises the cost of 
exit.209 This section addresses the mechanism’s first element, while the second element is 
examined in the following section 
 
A strategic request for amendment is one made for the purpose of exploiting other 
parties’ postratification investment in relationship-specific assets in order to extract a greater 
share of the net surplus from constitution-making. For example, imagine a Constitution that 
creates a single-member electoral system.210 Responding to the incentives created by that 
arrangement, a national-level interest group might invest heavily in local networks of candidates 
with close connections to the electorate, rather than developing a nationally recognized brand. 
These investments contribute to the public good of stable political competition, but may be 
vulnerable to the threat of strategic renegotiation. For example, an opposing interest group might 
press an amendment directing the use of a party-list proportional representation system, which 
                                                 
206 Cooter & Siegel, supra note 202, at 140, 149–50. 
207 See STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 204, at 39–41 (emphasizing taxing, borrowing, spending, and coinage 
powers); BROWN, supra note 203, at 186 (emphasizing taxing power). Pure public goods public goods are (1) 
nonrivalrous, such that one person’s enjoyment does not detract from another’s, and (2) nonexcludable, such that 
excluding individuals from enjoying the benefits generated by the goods is infeasible or uneconomical. Military 
defense is a quintessential example.  
208 2 FARRAND, supra note 28, at 131–32; accord Cooter & Siegel, supra note 191, at 123–24 (discussing 
Convention deliberations on congressional powers).  
209 Cf. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 120–21 (contrasting the use of voice and exit in firms and governments).  
210 See U.S. CONST. Art. I, §2, cl. 3. 
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would undermine its competitor’s investments. If amendment was easy to achieve, even the mere 
threat of such an amendment might elicit costly bargaining or even preclude investments in party 
infrastructure ab initio. Other examples of hold-up can be imagined in the trade context. Imagine, 
for example, an interest group that contributes to the national government’s investments in 
banking infrastructure but foregoes development of its own monetary institutions. Its investments 
are imperiled by an amendment proposing limits on national monetary authority and a 
redistribution of such authority to the states. In both examples, the easier amendment is, the 
cheaper strategic invocation of the amendment power becomes.  
 
A strategic request for amendment need not focus on a point already crisply resolved in 
constitutional text. Provided that other parties have relationship-specific investments in the 
constitutional order, amendments can be invoked strategically to redistribute surpluses between 
parties even in the absence of a textual settlement. Consider the example of American slavery. 
The Constitution did not expressly prohibit or endorse slavery, although six of its provisions 
implicitly endorsed and protected the practice.211 Arguments for the prohibition of slavery were 
vociferously pressed in the antebellum period.212 It is telling that Congress’s response was not to 
try to settle the matter by constitutional amendment or legislation, but instead to install a “gag 
rule,” precluding debate on the matter213 and to pursue territorial compromises that delayed any 
final reckoning.214 Bracketing the profound moral questions raised by such deferrals—e.g. the 
question whether preservation of the Constitution warranted a deferment of (or even a failure to) 
slavery’s resolution—these legislative responses can be understood as a recognition that slavery 
presented questions then too divisive for resolution. In the same light, the rigor of Article V, and 
in particular the singling out in Article V of the slave trade for an especially onerous and 
restrictive amendment rule, can be construed as evidence that the Framers intimated the 
possibility that slavery could be used as a wedge to split apart the Union. By making it all but 
impossible to amend the Constitution in respect to slavery, the Framers delayed any reckoning 
with that institution until the Union had gained sufficiently in strength to survive that rupture.215 
Article V thus operated to preserve constitutional ambiguities as much as it protected elements of 
the constitutional deal that had been set forth in clear text.216  
 
In each of these examples, Article V operated akin to a no-modification rule in a private-
law contract by effectively switched the parties’ choice set from ‘adhere-modify-exit’ to ‘adhere 
or exit.’ This alteration in the parties’ options mitigated the risk of strategic requests for 
amendment by making the expected payoff from such renegotiation ex ante much smaller. In this 
                                                 
211 See WALDENSTEICHER, supra note 110, at 71–105. 
212 See WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE 
UNITED STATES CONGRESS 65–93 (1995) (describing social movements behind anti-slavery petitioning). 
213 DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, & POLITICS 58 (1981). 
214 LOUIS P. MASUR; THE CIVIL WAR: A CONCISE HISTORY 11–12 (2012); see also DAVID M. POTTER, THE 
IMPENDING CRISIS 1848-1861, at 90–120 (1976) (detailing the negotiation of the compromise). 
215 This is a very narrowly-defined view of constitutional success. Indeed, I cannot emphasize enough that my aim 
here is not to endorse the Framers’ approach, or to critique it. The question of how to grapple with slavery under 
conditions in which the institution has considerable political support, and where secession might have prolonged its 
evil effects, strikes me as a profoundly difficult one—one well outside the scope of the current Article.  
216 It is nevertheless at least debatable whether sectional balance succeeded on its own terms. Rather, the 1850 
compromise, which admitted California as a free state, upset the balance between free and slave states, and did not 
resolve how slavery would thereafter be treated in the territories. To Southern politicians like John Calhoun, the 
Compromise destroyed “irretrievably the equilibrium between the two sections.” MASUR, supra note 214, at 12.  
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fashion, Article V took an option (seeking strategic amendments) that would have increased the 
risk of hold-up largely off the table. Doing so both mitigated a reason not to ratify and removed a 
source of post-ratification inefficiency.  
 
Taking modification off the table has a positive effect on constitutional stability even 
assuming exit remains a substantial possibility—although I will argue in a moment that textual 
rigidity mitigates the risk of exit through another mechanism. Parties that would engage in 
strategic hold-ups by seeking constitutional amendment in light of others’ asset-specific 
investments cannot simply switch strategies in the face of a no-modification rule to threaten exit 
so as to gain the same concessions. Amendment and exit are not fungible because constitutions 
do not comprise single or even a single-digit number of rules. Rather, they typically bundle 
plural packages of enabling rules and constraining rules together as a take-it-or-leave-it 
package.217 All else being equal, it is likely that some sticks of the bundle benefit a party while 
other sticks in the bundle impose undesirable constraints. By exiting, a party loses both the 
benefits and the burdens of a constitution because exit is an all-or-nothing decision.218 By 
contrast, renegotiation through amendment allows the same party to sort between the sticks of 
the constitutional bundle, choosing for disapprobation only those measures it views as 
undesirable. As a result, in the ordinary course of events, renegotiation of the constitutional deal 
through amendment will be a far more attractive vehicle for strategic exploitation than wholesale 
exit. The former, but not the latter, allows a potential defector to select the parts of the 
constitutional bargain it finds beneficial. By taking modification off the table, textual rigidity 
leaves open only the more costly option of exit.219 At least in some class of cases, an interest 
group willing to game the amendment process will not chance the price of exit. Hence, once 
modification is off the table, exit does not pick up all the slack. 
 
3. Subconstitutional Investments and the Risk of Exit  
 
 There is a second causal strand linking textual rigidity to constitutional survival. Beyond 
mitigating hold-up, textual obduracy also dampens the allure of exit. The link between rigidity 
and the mitigation of exit risk is not direct. It is mediated through subconstitutional institutions—
i.e., institutions not formally required by the text or reflected via textual amendment but instead 
that necessarily emerge as part of the downstream functioning of a constitutional framework.220 
Such institutions are needed to produce public goods, such as peaceful political competition, 
economic growth, and national security, which justify a constitution’s creation. Two examples—
both developed below—include a political party system and a fiscal infrastructure.  
                                                 
217 See Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or Politics), 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 806–07 (2012). In the 
United States, federal officials take an oath to defend the whole Constitution. See U.S. CONST. Art. VI, §3.  
218 Cf. PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 33 (2004) (exploring some 
of the effects of “‘lumpy’ or ‘winner-takes-all’” political goods).  
219 Notice, however, that this binary choice can, through a different mechanism, accelerate exit.  
220 My usage of the term “institutions” here is a loose one, and at odds with one leading work. According to 
Douglass North, “[i]nstitution are the rule of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devices 
constraints that shape human interaction.” DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990). By contrast, “[o]rganizations are created to take advantages of th[e] 
opportunities” created by institutions. Id. at 7. In North’s locution, I will often be discussing “organizations” below. 
But at least in this context, I find his terminology potentially confusing, and thus use the term “institutions” in its 
loose, more demotic sense.  
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Textual rigidity enables the creation of such subconstitutional institutions since parties to 
the constitution would not contribute to create such institutions without assurances against hold 
ups. But the new institutional ecosystem is also independently causally efficacious because it 
entangles those same parties in the constitutional order by fixing their investments in an asset-
specific form. If those parties exit the constitution, they lose the tailored resources, knowledge, 
and skills invested in the new institutional ecosystem. In this way, institutions enabled by textual 
rigidity fostered greater lock-in to the underlying constitution and diminished resistance to 
cooperative investments. This adds up to a virtuous circle—a set of “self-reinforcing processes 
that [make] reversals increasingly unattractive.”221  
 
 This virtuous circle mechanism is grounded on the assumption that constitutions not only 
establish basic governance frameworks but also “induc[e] the development of economic and 
political organizations.”222 A new ecosystem of parties, institutions, and networks is necessary 
for realizing welfare gains immanent in the incomplete constitutional bargain. In its absence, a 
new constitutional framework would be a dead letter, and the public goods that government is 
typically tasked with producing would never materialize. The necessary institutional ecosystem, 
however, need not be memorialized in constitutional text. To the contrary, new parties, 
institutions, and networks may take an exclusively subconstitutional form, as indeed they have in 
the United States. Despite its ‘subconstitutional’ character—in the sense of being located 
underneath the text of a constitution and not in that text—a new institutional ecosystem will 
inevitably develop along a path tailored specifically to a particular constitution’s topography. 
Elections, for example, create incentives to organize in specific ways in anticipation of 
campaigns for political office in certain geographic jurisdictions.223 The fiscal infrastructure of a 
new constitution will also induce certain patterns of investment and commercial activity, not 
least by restricting or expanding the expected supply of credit. And by resolving public-good 
problems that impede certain channels of internal commerce and external trade, a newly 
constituted government may encourage investment in some trading relationships rather than 
others.224  
 
 This asset-specific infrastructure for the production of public goods has the effect of 
making exit from a constitution by a pivotal party less likely. It has value in large part because it 
fits tightly a particular constitution’s text, but has “far less value under alternative institutional 
arrangements.”225 For example, a political party ceases to be tailored if fundamental parameters 
                                                 
221 PIERSON, supra note 218, at 35. For an interesting example of another self-reinforcing process of political 
stabilitization mediated through norms, rather than via third-party enforcement, see the discussion of Russian 
integration into Estonia in Avner Greif & David Laitin, A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, 98 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 633, 647 (2004).  
222 NORTH, supra note 220, at 8. 
223 See, e.g., William H. Riker, The Two-Party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political 
Science, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 753 (1982).  
224 NORTH, supra note 220, at 77 (“The kinds of information and knowledge required by the entrepreneur are in 
good part a consequence of a particular institutional context.”).  
225 Cf. NORTH, supra note 220, at 7 (stating that “lock-in … comes from the symbiotic relationship” between a 
general framework and specific entities that have adapted to that framework). For the point being made in reference 
to political institutions, see PIERSON, supra note 218, at 149 (“Individual politicians, political organizations such as 
parties, interest groups, and even ordinary citizens will, over time, develop assets that are specific to a political 
institution (or set of institutions).”). For the same point being made in reference to commercial institutions, see 
36 
 
of the voting system change, say making local linkages more important than national profiles. 
Trade relationships with a country cease to have as much value if one’s country goes to war with 
it. Currency becomes worthless without the central bank that backs it. The asset specificity of 
cooperative investments raises the cost of exit for parties to the constitution who have “invest[ed] 
in specialized skills, deepen[ed] relationships with other officials and organizations, and 
develop[ed] particular political and social identities.”226 Over time, that is, the positive network 
externalities from learning and adaption to a particular political or commercial context227 and the 
correlative cost of switching to another institutional framework both grow.228 The expected loss 
in value of cooperative investments becomes in effect a tax upon exit from the constitution. As 
this tax on exit enlarges over time, parties can be increasingly confident that their investments 
will not be turned against them. Confidence thus induces investment, which in turn fosters 
greater confidence.  
 
 While perhaps small at inception, this locking-in effect grows over time through the 
operation of a positive feedback mechanism.229 In the long term, that process tends to generate 
“massive increasing returns” on an initial investment.230 Under these conditions, participants in a 
constitutional system likely develop “[a]daptive expectations … because increased prevalence of 
contracting based on a specific institution will reduce the uncertainties about the permanence of 
the rule.”231 These expectations then further entrench the constitution,232 deepening the effect of 
the virtuous circle mechanism. 
 
4. Subconstitutional Institutions with Lock-In Effects in the Early Republic   
 
Are there example “of political institutions” enabled by the parsimonious text of the 1787 
Constitution “to deal creatively with ongoing developments … outside the Constitution”?233 In 
this section, I offer two case studies—political parties and the national financial infrastructure 
that coalesced around the Bank of the United States. At the same time, I do not mean to imply 
that these are the only such virtuously entrenching institutions. I focus on institutions that 
emerged at the beginning of the Republic because it is during the first few decades that textual 
rigidity was most likely to be useful. My claim here is that both subconstitutional institutions are 
                                                                                                                                                             
Daron Acemoglu et al., The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth, 95 AM. 
ECON. REV. 546 (2006). 
226 NORTH, supra note 220, at 7.  
227 Id. (identifying “significant learning effects for organizations that arise in consequence of the opportunity set 
provided by [an] institutional framework”); PIERSON, supra note 218, at 24.  
228 Peter Alexis Gourevitch, The Governance Problem in International Relations, in STRATEGIC CHOICE AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 137, 144–45 (D. Lake & R. Powell, eds. 2000) (“Where investments in the specific 
assets of an institution are high, actors will find the cost of any institutional change that endangers those assets to be 
quite high; indeed actors in this situation may be reluctant to run risks of any change at all ….”). 
229 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitments, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 657, 687 (2011) (identifying “positive political feedback” in instances in which “[s]tructures and 
processes of political decisionmaking, as well as particular policy outcomes, often reshape politics in ways that 
increase support for the institutions themselves”).  
230 NORTH, supra note 220, at 95. 
231 Id.  
232 Moreover, the sheer complexity of the institutional system, with different rules, exceptions, and standards 
developing to the betterment of one or another interest group, will grow over time, further increasing systemic 
stability. 
233 Young, supra note 21, at 456 (answering this question in the affirmative). 
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plausibly understood as having been enabled by textual rigidity. In both cases, I am willing to 
concede that there is a nonfrivolous argument that the institutional novation might be viewed as 
one that demanded a formal amendment, which in practice was unavailable due to Article V. At 
the same time, that same provision of the Constitution stabilized expectations in a way that made 
possible the practical investments that allowed parties and banks to develop as plausible 
subconstitutional adaptions, rather than additions to the 1787 text.    
 
a. National political parties  
 
Consider first the evolution of the early Republic’s national political party system. This 
system was tailored to the 1787 constitutional dispensation. It also yielded increasing stability-
related returns up through the late 1810s. To be sure, the party system underwent transformation 
after the war of 1812, and then collapsed in the late 1850s, opening the road to secession and the 
Civil War.234 For my limited purposes, it suffices to show that the first party system was the kind 
of stabilizing cooperative investment enabled by constitutional rigidity, and that it promoted 
stability in the first two high-risk decades of the early Republic.  
 
The architects of the 1787 Constitution famously “did not believe in political parties as 
such” and instead “had a keen terror of party spirit and its evil consequences.”235 Early federal 
candidates believed it dishonorable to campaign actively for office, and so turnout in federal 
elections tended to be small.236 Yet by September 1792, James Madison could write that national 
political parties were “natural”237 and by the second Congress “most officeholders could be 
identified as Federalists or (Jeffersonian) Republicans.”238 While these new political formations 
did not entirely resemble today’s political parties239 and kept their distance from the more 
grassroots Democratic-Republic societies of the day,240 they still were characterized by “a 
comprehensive and common ideology.”241 
 
This two-party system was tightly fitted to the specifics of the 1787 constitutional 
framework in etiology and form. At its origin, the party system was “largely a[n] alliance 
between … elites” in the Philadelphia Convention.242 Recent empirical analysis of voting 
                                                 
234 For a brief recap of this history, see DEAN MCSWEENEY & JOHN ZVESPER, AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: THE 
FORMATION, DECLINE, AND REFORM OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM 13–21 (1991). 
235 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1789-1840, x, 52–53 (1969) (arguing that those constitutional designers relied not on the “mutual checks of 
political parties’ but on the “classic doctrine of separation of power” as sources of “liberty and stability”); id. at 64–
73 (discussing the Federalist 10 as a tract against parties); accord JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? A SECOND 
LOOK 71 (2011); MCSWEENEY & ZVESPER, supra note 234, at 41. 
236 GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 158–60 (2009) 
[hereinafter WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY]. Nor was the design that emerged from the Pennsylvania state house in the 
summer of 1787 broadly friendly to populist democracy. See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: 
FROM JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 32–33 (2005) (describing “antidemocratic” themes in the Philadelphia deliberations). 
237WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 236, at 161.  
238 ALDRICH, supra note 235, at 79; WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTy, supra note 236, at 162. 
239 ALDRICH, supra note 235, at 99. 
240 WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 236, at 162–63 (describing the growth of the societies and noting that 
“elite leaders like Jefferson and Madison … tended to keep well clear of them”). 
241 Id. at 173; see also WILENTZ, supra note 236, at 40–43. 
242 WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 236, at 64. 
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patterns in the Philadelphia Convention demonstrates that by its close “the interest constellations 
within the Convention” as revealed in patterns in voting coalitions “were similar to those in the 
newly settled political field” so that “state [delegate] alignments forecas[t] the contours of the 
future party system.”243 Analysis of voting patterns in the 1789 Congress also reveal that early, 
pre-party votes were “shifting” and “chaotic” as a consequence of cycling-based instability.244 It 
may thus be that the push toward a duopolistic party system was deepened by the need to 
mitigate cycling problems in the federal Congress,245 making the national party system a de facto 
adaption to the Constitution’s choice of democratic mechanisms. 
 
The first party system also had the effect of promoting political stability in the perilous 
first years of the Republic. Parties did not merely articulate popular concerns, they also “helped 
simultaneously to channel that discontent back into the system.”246 “When disgruntled citizens 
began murmuring about secession and civil war, party leaders were able to encourage them to 
turn to the polls…”247 During the sectional fracas over the Alien and Sedition Acts, for example, 
leaders of the new national parties in state legislatures ensured that the alarums of the Virginia 
and Kentucky resolutions produced no more amplitudinous destabilizing echo.248 Even in the 
throes of the partisan crisis of the 1800 election, the party structures dampened proclivities to 
exit the constitutional order. Hence, Federalist letters and memoirs of the late 1790s evince “a 
basic predisposition … to accept a defeat, fairly administered, even in 1800 before that defeat 
was a certainty.”249 That is, it was the Federalist network that disseminated the view that 
electoral defeat was not an occasion for defection from the Constitution. At the same time, 
parties served as the vehicles for expressing “sectional interests” in a way that did not result in 
terminal instability.250 Political parties, in short, locked in powerful interest groups through 
investments in assets specific to the 1787 Constitution, assets that, over time, delivered political 
stability at an otherwise perilous moment.251 
                                                 
243 Adam Slez & John Levi Martin, Political Action and Party Formation in the United States Constitutional 
Convention, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 42, 43, 58–59 (2007) (reporting data in fig. 5). 
244 ALDRICH, supra note 235, at 77–78. The observation that the use of a majority-vote rule by a collectivity to 
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250 ELLIS, supra note 246, at 186. For evidence that this stabilization effect persists into the second party system, see 
JOHN F. BIBBY, POLITICS, PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN AMERICA 31 (4th ed. 2000) (attributing the “lack of 
sectionalism in American politics … to the skills of Democratic and Whig politicians”). 
251 At the same time, the rise of parties likely exacerbated the electoral crisis of 1800. See Bruce Ackerman & David 
Fontana, Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself Into the Presidency, 94 VA. L. REV. 551, 568–71 (2004). This shows 
how institutions can have complex, even partially offsetting, effects on constitutional survival. 
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b. The Bank of the United States 
 
 At first blush, the Bank of the United States seems an unpromising candidate for positive 
feedback effects. Established first in 1791 despite a chorus of constitutional criticisms, the 
Bank’s charter expired twenty years later and was not immediately renewed. The Second Bank, 
chartered in 1816, then saw renewal legislation vetoed by President Jackson in 1832.252 But both 
the 1816 and the 1836 dissolutions of the bank triggered runs on state banks, suspensions of their 
operation, and national financial crises.253 Rather than suggesting superfluity, such consequences 
of dissolution point to the Bank’s pivotal role in the new nation’s “modern financial system,”254 a 
system that enabled “history’s most successful emerging market, attracting the capital or 
investors in older nations seeking higher returns.”255 The Bank, like national political parties, 
was thus a post-ratification institutional novation, created within the new constitutional 
framework—and one that proved essential to the new dispensation’s survival. By fostering a 
robust internal economy, even as frictions with foreign powers limited the growth of external 
trade,256 the Bank in effect locked in states and important interest groups into a growing 
American economy—and therefore the American Constitution—that could survive financial 
contractions in 1812 and 1836.  
 
 At the time of Bank’s creation in 1791, only five other banks existed in the United 
States.257 The new Bank, Hamilton predicted, would increase the money supply through its 
emission of noninflationary paper currency, lower the cost of government borrowing, and 
facilitate the payment and collection of taxes.258 By assuming the debt of the several states, it and 
then assuting bondholders of a reliable interest stream, the Bank would “liberate the country’s 
commercial energy by yoking high finance to national projects.”259 Yet Hamilton failed to 
predict perhaps its most important policy consequence: On account of being the largest 
transactor in the money market, the main government fiscal depository, and a general creditor of 
other banks, the Bank “automatically exercised a general restraint upon the banking system” and 
effectively established “central bank control of credit.”260 As well as a competitor to local banks, 
the Bank acted as their “constant regulator” by dint of its collection of balances due from local 
banks.261 The bank’s dissolution in 1812 only revealed the Treasury’s “need” for a central bank 
“not merely to lend it money but to marshal the banking system” and to maintain a credible 
                                                 
252 The best history of the Bank remains BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE 
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currency.262 In addition to generating new interstate frictions as banks declined to lend across 
state lines,263 in the teeth of looming British invasion, dissolution proved near “disastrous for the 
war effort.”264  
 
The Bank fits both prerequisites for a subconstitutional institution with lock-in effects. 
First, it was a costly innovation tightly configured to the specifics of the new Constitution, one 
that required expenditure of much political capital to secure passage.265 A more flexible 
constitutional amendment regime, which would have enabled less costly modifications of the 
bank’s structure and simpler defaults on creditors, may have impeded the expenditure of that 
political capital. The Bank also yielded a welfare surplus by providing a fiscal infrastructure for 
the federal government.266 And, despite some opposition from state banks, its central bank 
function enabled the growth of state banking.267  
 
Second, the Bank, despite dissolutions in 1811 and 1836, had lock-in effects. Most 
obviously, the Bank’s initial subscriptions induced fiscal investments by key members of the 
political class.268 This had the direct effect of giving a large number of key political actors a 
(literal) stake in the federal government’s success.269 More subtly, the Bank grew the supply of 
national credit,270 and thereby fostered an internal market that entangled together interests across 
the several states.271 Without the expansion of credit enabled by the First Bank, it is at least 
arguable that American “society could never have commercialized as rapidly as it did.”272 To be 
sure, not every decision by the Bank was correct.273 Yet on balance, it seems fair to label the 
                                                 
262 Id. at 230; accord STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 204, at 71–72 (describing the “profound repercussions on 
the economy” of the 1811 refusal to reauthorize).  
263 STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 204, at 80. 
264 WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 236, at 673.  
265 In particular, debate within the executive was fierce. HAMMOND, supra note 252, at 114–18 (describing 
enactment history and debates within the Washington Administration). 
266 Id. at 208 (“The Bank acted as fiscal agent of the Treasury; it effected payments of interest on the public debt, at 
home and abroad; it received subscriptions to new issues of government securities; it effected payment of the 
salaries of government officials … ; it moderated the outflow of specie; and it supplied bullion and foreign coin to 
the Mint.”).  
267 Id. at 198–99. The Second Bank, indeed, was instrumental in ending state bank runs and suspensions triggered by 
the dissolution of the first Bank. Id. at 246–47. It is no small irony that those same state banks resented the Bank’s 
enabling constraints and “from the beginning … sought to destroy or weaken it.” WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra 
note 236, at 294. 
268 Among the subscribers to the Bank’s first subscription were more than a third of the sitting members of Congress 
and the state of New Hampshire. HAMMOND, supra note 252, at 123. 
269 Id. at 206. 
270 See STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 204, at 107 (“The Federal government [i.e., the Bank] encouraged the 
expansion of state banks by accepting their notes in payment for public lands and by building up their reserves 
through the deposit of paper money.”); accord Rockoff, supra note 252, at 647.  
271 See DAVID WALKER HOWE, WHAT GOD HATH WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1813-1848, 144 
(2007) (“By 1819, economic relations had become strongly interconnected ….”). 
272 WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 236, at 297. Wood here is referring to the growth of state banks, but my 
point is that the growth in effective state banking would not have been possible without the central banking function 
played by the Bank of the United States. Cf. HAMMOND, supra note 252, at 246–47 (describing how second bank 
kick-started credit system in 1816). Of course, at some point, the number of state banks becomes excessive and 
potentially inflationary in effect. 
273 See, e.g., HOWE, supra note 271, at 142–43 (noting how the Second Bank’s 1819 credit contraction deepened a 
financial crisis). 
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Bank as a rigidity-enabled instrument of entanglement—and hence stabilization—in the early 
Republic. 
C. Anchoring a Constitution in Cooperative Institutions  
 
This Part has identified two causal pathways mechanisms by which textual rigidity 
promotes a constitution’s survival—by mitigating hold-ups and by inducing virtuous circles of 
investment and confidence-accretion. Notwithstanding the Framers’ inchoate understanding of 
amendment dynamics, there is some evidence that Article V had both effects in the key period of 
the early Republic. These mechanisms diverge from dominant accounts of constitutional survival 
canvassed in Part I.B, which are more focused on a need for “enforcers” drawn from “the 
opposition” or “the citizenry.”274 On the latter view, the central problem of constitutional rule is 
defection, and constitutions persist when they succeed in lowering the cost to enforcers of 
detecting, preventing, and correcting defections by others.275 This view focuses attention on the 
question of how to minimize the costs of enforcement.276 It also leads to a concern for how 
constitutional text can serve as a “focal point” to “narrow the range of disagreements” thereby 
lowering the costs of coordinating opposition to constitutional breaches.277  
 
By contrast, the mechanisms presented in this Part turn on the inducements that a 
constitution creates for parties to comply, even absent third-party enforcement. This is consistent 
                                                 
274 ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 76; accord Peter C. Ordeshook, Constitutional Stability, 3 CONST. 
POL. ECON. 137, 143 (1992) (concluding that the “most important problem” in constitutional design is “how such a 
contract is enforced”). 
275 Mittal & Weingast, supra note 123, at 5; accord Sutter, supra note 13, at 140 (focusing on defection risk). North 
and Weingast’s famous account of the 1688 Glorious Revolution in England places its same emphasis on a similar 
theme. They argue that the revolutionary settlement created a “self-enforcing” arrangement in which the parliament 
could check the monarch by vetoing “major changes in policy,” while parliament was constrained by its internal 
collective action costs, the libertarian bent of the governing Whigs, and “a politically independent judiciary.” 
Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing 
Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 817–19 (1989). This is in essence a claim 
about the mutuality of potential constitutional enforcement.  
276 ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 78–80, 88–90 (developing a theoretical account of constitutional 
endurance based on the ability based on the active participation of interest groups in policing a constitutional 
bargain).  
277 Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 6, at 912–13; accord Mittal & Weingast, supra 
note 123, at 7 (“When citizens fail to act in concert … leaders can exploit these differences ….”); Sutter, supra note 
13, at 145 (describing constitutional enforcement as a public good, and identifying free-rider and monitoring 
problems related to enforcement); Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability, supra note 87, at 348–49 
(discussing “the coordination problem underlying democratic stability” and extending the point to the constitutional 
context); Ordeshook, supra note 274, at 147 (identifying the need for coordinating mechanisms in a constitution); 
see also Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
245, 246 (1997) (arguing that political “pacts” underpinning democracy “create a focal solution that resolves the 
coordination dilemmas confronting elites and citizens”). Constitutional text enable coordination between they 
provide “common knowledge,” which is essential to any form of social cooperation. MICHAEL SUK-YOUNG CHWE, 
RATIONAL RITUAL: CULTURE, COORDINATION, AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE 7, 14 (2001). Constitutional focal points 
also “define appropriate bounds on governments and rights of citizens” and induce enforcement provided that 
citizens believe themselves better off with those rules than without. Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability, 
supra note 87, at 352–53. For an elaboration of the point that parties must see themselves better off inside than out 
of a constitutional order, see Mittal & Weingast, supra note 123, at 8. 
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with private contracting dynamics, where deals abound even absent enforcement as a result of 
“the dynamics of interactions” generating “mutually built assets of value to either party.”278  
III. Revisiting the Puzzles of Article V 
 
This Part reconsiders the positive and normative puzzles identified in Part I in light of 
Part II’s proposed causal link between textual rigidity and constitutional survival. To begin with, 
I return to the question of why the U.S. Constitution’s survival seems so anomalous in 
comparison to other nations’ experiences. The first section of this Part thus reconsiders the 
question why rigid constitutions are so rare in a global perspective. Next, I focus on the 
normative critiques of Article V. Accounting for the function of textual rigidity, I suggest, casts 
these critiques in a fresh light.  Finally, I press further on the normative implications of the 
analysis by suggesting that they also illuminate ongoing debates about legitimacy of both judicial 
review in general and also specific methods of constitutional intepretation.  
A. The Infrequency of Rigid Constitutions  
 
If my arguments in Part II respecting the U.S. Constitution have any purchase, they ought 
to provoke a new puzzlement: If rigidity does indeed conduce to constitutional survival in the 
manner suggested by Part II, why does comparative epidemiological analysis of constitutional 
survival suggest that it so often fails?279 That is, why is the United States an outlier? There are 
two reasons for the dearth of observable successful rigid constitutions beyond U.S. borders. They 
explain respectively why rigidity will not always be an appropriate design choice and, even when 
it is warranted, why rigidity still often fails. In tandem, I contend, these reasons account for the 
infrequency of textual rigidity in durable constitutions.  
 
To begin with, it is worth illustrating the rarity of the U.S. Constitution. Figure I plots 
data for 169 constitutions derived from the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) database.280 
The y-axis shows the duration of the constitution. (The publicly available part of the database 
does not specify duration data for surviving constitutions; hence the U.S. Constitution does not 
appear). The x-axis records the rate of amendment as calculated by the CCP. Data for the 169 
least amended documents (up to and including the U.S. Constitution) is presented.281 The 
resulting scatter plot can be understood as snapshot estimating how likely infrequently amended 
constitutions are to survive.  
 
 
                                                 
278 Éric Brousseau, Contracts: From Bilateral Sets of Incentives to the Multi-Level Governance of Relationships, in 
BROUSSEAU & GLACHANT, supra note 123, at 37, 57. This is the familiar point from game theory that a cooperative 
game that is not stable if played only once can be stable in circumstances of repeat play because of the present-
discounted value of the stream of expected future benefits. See Thiéry Penard, Game Theory and Institutions, in 
BROUSSEAU & GLACHANT, supra note 123, at 170–71. 
279 See infra Part I.A. 
280 Data obtained from http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/. I am grateful to Tom Ginburg for providing 
this data.   
281 To this end, I use the “amendment rate” variable in the Comparative Constitiutions Project database.  Descriptive 
statistics for this variable are presented at ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 226 (Table A.4). 
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Figure 1: Duration in Years of Rigid Constitutions (n=169) 
 
This data suggests that, at least within the pool of rigid constitutions, the odds of endurance are 
typically low. Only two constitutions in the sample proved relatively durable: the Bhutanese 
Constitution of 1953 (52 years) and the El Salvadorian Constitution of 1886 (53 years). 
Lifespans akin to that of the U.S. Constitution are relatively rare. No other clear secular trend 
emerges, however, from the data. This suggesting that much more granular analysis using local 
information about specific nations’ political and institutional circumstances would be needed to 
identify causal forces at work. The CCP database does not contain that data.  
 
The analysis of Part II, nevertheless, points towards two reasons why rigid constitutions 
seem to rarely persist in the fashion of the U.S. Constitution. The first reason for rigidity’s 
infrequency was intimated at the opening of Part II: Textual rigidity is a response to one specific 
contracting problem of hold-up. It is not a general solution to the problems of constitutional 
survival. But, as discussed, not all constitutional drafters need to be concerned about hold-up. 
They need not be concerned, for example, if robust national institutions already exist. Hence, 
constitutional makers in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall would not have needed 
to attend to my argument because they already possessed many necessary state institutions, even 
aside from the potential for fiscal and epistemic aid from western European counterparts.282 And 
they should focus away from hold-up concerns if there is no set of robust political competitors 
who might readily unsettle the constitutional order.283 Only when neither robust institutions nor 
oligopolistic political competition is present does textual rigidity have potential utility. Hence, if 
there are no large set of cases in which both these factors are indeed absent—as the data in 
                                                 
282 See generally Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 477 (1991). 
283 The failure of the Articles of Confederations, which required unanimity for amendments, suggests that rigidity 
can also induce failure when a constitution fails to provide space for subconstitutional institutions or is otherwise 
poorly designed. Given that both the Articles and also the 1787 Constitution are rigid, it is not plausible to ascribe 
that the former’s failure solely to its inflexibility. That is, it is not that the Articles of Confederation miscalculated 
the amendment rule and the 1787 Constitution got matters just right—the documents’ contents and enactment 
politics also mattered greatly.  
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Figure 1 suggests—constitution makers would be wise to view textual flexibility with 
skepticism.  
 
The second reason for rigidity’s rarity is that textual inflexibility is a risky strategy for 
producing constitutional stability. Close attention to the mechanisms identified in Part II suggests 
the success of a rigid constitution will turn disproportionately on decisions made by the first 
post-enactment generations of interest-groups and factions. Interest groups in that period have 
two potential strategies in response to a rigid constitution. First, they can make cooperative 
investments, which will have increasing welfare returns and will over time embed interest groups 
into a specific constitutional framework.284 Second, because rigidity merely mitigates the risk of 
hold-up, and does not eliminate it entirely, risk-averse interest groups confronting a new 
constitution may also decline entirely to invest. The sharply dichotomous character of this 
election implies that small changes in behavior and judgment in the early days after a 
constitution’s ratification will have large effects on the chances of a constitution’s survival. 
Because they are highly sensitive to small, early-stage decisions, rigidity-based mechanisms of 
constitutional survival are likely to have ex ante a “knife-edged” quality: “Everything hinges on 
a single threshold determination”—to invest or not to invest?—with large, irreversible 
downstream consequences.285 The chances of success may be finely balanced, with small 
changes cascading into large differences in long-term pay-offs. When a pool of rigid 
constitutions is observed ex post, it is likely that some cases fall on either side of the knife’s 
edge, such that the pool will contain failures as well as successes.  
 
This knife-edge quality of rigidity-based mechanisms is intertwined with path-dependent 
nature of early constitutional development. In path dependent processes, “large consequences 
may result from relatively ‘small’ or contingent events [and] particular courses of action, once 
introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse” as a result of feedback mechanisms that 
entrench certain features of the status quo.286 In constitutional development under a rigid 
amendment rule, “[m]any paths are possible at the early stages,” with the choice turning on 
seemingly small decisions; but after those decisions are made, “the path will be ‘locked in.’”287 
How those early decisions will turn out in any given case is hard to predict. The decision to 
invest or not under a new constitution will depend on what in effect are “random” effects,288 such 
as the personalities of relevant political agents, accidents of historical circumstances, and other 
factors outside the constitutional designers capacity to predict, let alone control. Sometimes, as 
with the Articles of Confederation, those factors will not converge to produce constitutional 
endurance. This large sensitivity to randomly distributed exogenous stresses—the “importance of 
                                                 
284 Cf. PIERSON, supra note 218, at 21 (noting that a core feature of path dependent systems is that “each step in a 
particular decision makes it more difficult to reverse course). 
285 Adrian Vermeule, Holmes on Emergencies, 61 STAN. L. REV. 163, 199 (2008).  
286 PIERSON, supra note 218, at 18–19; see also NORTH, supra note 220, at 93–94 (developing the idea of path 
dependency); see also ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECTS: COMPLEXITY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE 155–61 
(1997). Path dependency comes in two flavors: It can arise due to “self-reinforcing sequences” of the kind described 
in Part II, or it can occur because of a “reactive sequence,” which is a “chai[n] of temporally ordered and causally 
connected events.” James Mahoney, Path dependence in historical sociology, 29 THEORY & SOC. 507, 508–09 
(2000). 
287 JERVIS, supra note 286, at 156. 
288 PIERSON, supra note 218, at 18. 
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contingency”289—gives the appearance that a constitution’s fate rests on a knife’s edge in its 
early stages.290 Ex ante, survival is hard to predict or guarantee; ex post, the pattern of failures 
and successes can seem arbitrary.291  
 
The knife-edge quality of path dependent processes may be compounded in the case of 
rigidity-induced constitutional stability by a further dynamic. In most cases, the post-enactment 
game is not binary. Cooperatively-produced public goods, such as new political or economic 
institutions, may require the participation of many. These institutions, as a result, may be “step 
goods” that “will be produced only if enough members … of the group contribute.”292 Given the 
“strongly complementary” nature of contributions to step goods,293 potential contributors may 
not come forward unless they know or expect that most, if not all, other potential contributors 
will participate. In the context of the 1787 Constitution, for example, each state wanted to join 
the new constitution provided a sufficient number of others joined.294 At the same time, perfect 
contribution was not needed: Hence, the decisions of North Carolina and Rhode Island not to 
ratify at first did not undermine the Constitution’s September 1788 activation.295 In cases of 
common contributions to step goods, the presence or absence of common expectations may make 
the difference between success and failure.296 Common beliefs that others will contribute 
                                                 
289 JERVIS, supra note 286, at 156. 
290 See also Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public 
Monitoring, 10 REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 173, 174–75 (2007) (describing path-creating effects of knife-edged 
decisions).  
291 Cf. NORTH, supra note 220, at 98–99 (“Path dependency … is not a story of inevitability in which the past neatly 
predicts the future.”). Indeed, these reasons, path dependent accounts are often parsed as more useful for explaining 
outliers, such as the U.S. Constitution, than for generating covering laws for large sets of cases. See Mahoney, supra 
note 286, at 508 (“Substantive analyses of path-dependent sequences offer explanations for particular outcomes, 
often ‘deviant outcomes’ or instances of ‘exceptionalism.’”). One example of the importance of contingent and 
unexpected events in constitutional development concerns the contested 1800 election between Thomas Jefferson 
and John Adams. When that contest ended in a dead-lock between Jefferson and Aaron Burr, the immediate cause 
was the Framers’ failure to “think through the full ramifications” of the Vice President’s office. Ackerman & 
Fontana, supra note 251, at 555; id. at 560–67. The impasse would have been worse had not the Framers, perhaps 
foolishly entrusted the Chief Justice with counting contested ballots. Id. at 626–29 (noting that John Marshall, under 
this regime, would have been responsible for the count). Only another technical error in miscounting ballots may 
have saved the nation. Id. at 592. 
292 RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 55–59 (1982); see also THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND 
MACROBEHAVIOR 213–14 (1978) (describing problem).  
293 Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Goods, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1956 (2012). 
294 See, e.g., MAIER, supra note 36, at 124 (noting that even after four states had ratified, “the Constitution’s fate and 
the country’s future” hung in the balance). 
295 Id. at 428–30 (discussing the fact that North Carolina and Rhode Island had failed to ratify the 1787 Constitution 
on September 13, 1788, when “Congress formally announced that the Constitution had been ratified by the required 
number of states”).  
296 HARDIN, supra note 292, at 58–59; SCHELLING, supra note 292, at 215–16 (noting roles of both knowledge and 
expectations). On the other hand, recent work on collective choice has argued that a thin rationality generates 
sufficient reason to believe that others will contribute. Richard Tuck, for example, argues that “if I am faced with a 
situation where an accumulation of relatively small contributions eventually leads to the crossing of some threshold 
which I would welcome, then in general I have a good instrumental reason to make one of the contributions, 
assuming that enough others will be made.” RICHARD TUCK, FREE RIDING 99, 102–03 (2008). Relevant to the 
circumstances of the 1787 Constitution, Tuck also argues—quite persuasively—that eighteenth and nineteenth 
century theorists would have perceived no individual reason to refrain from collaboration in production in a 
collective good. Id. at 15. 
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conduce to a constitution’s success, while a momentary and transient failure of political culture 
might undermine the whole constitutional project. 
 
For all these reasons, constitutional design founded on textual rigidity is not for the faint 
of heart, even if circumstances otherwise conduce to the employment of rigidity. A rigid 
constitution’s survival partly depends on contingent events beyond a designer’s control. After the 
fact, what may seem manifest destiny may better be understood as a species of luck.297 
B. Revisiting and Revising the Normative Critiques of Article V 
 
The analysis to this point has offered a response to the positive puzzle of Article V. But 
recognizing a causal link between textual rigidity and constitutional survival may also cast light 
on the normative critiques of Article V showcased in Part I.C. Recall that the most forceful of 
these focus on Article V’s countermajoritarian and “dead hand” consequences. Condemnation of 
Article V on countermajoritarian grounds, though, takes on a paradoxical cast once the survival-
related benefits of rigidity are recognized. One can, after all, complain about the dead hand’s 
lingering grip only if one’s constitution has in fact survived long past its birth. Dead constitutions 
have no withering hold on democratic choice. In effect, critics who tender the countermajoritian 
charge assume a baseline of constitutional survival to launch an attack on the very mechanism 
that produced such survival. The more appropriate comparison juxtaposes a world after a 
constitution’s death with life under the rigid constitution. Criticism of Article V as 
countermajoritarian, in other words, is at best debatable and at worst rests on a flawed (if 
implicit) normative baseline. 
 
Yet the analysis developed in this Article also hints at a way of reworking the 
countermajoritarian critique of Article V. Rather than making an absolute claim about the 
deleterious consequences of textual rigidity, critics of Article V’s vice-like grip might instead 
focus on the possibility that an optimal constitutional amendment rule is not time invariant. As 
the empirical work of Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton demonstrates, the risk of constitutional death 
looms largest in the first two decades of a constitution’s life cycle, and thereafter drops off 
considerably.298 This finding suggests the value of a design mechanism to dampen the risk of 
failure will be great in those first two decades. I have argued that, at least in the American 
context, it is plausible to contend that early-stage mortality risk was mitigated in important part 
by the textual rigidity fostered by Article V.  
 
Notice though that I have been careful to specify that this justification only applies to an 
early period in the Constitution’s history. And I have further been careful not to claim that 
merely because a constitution survives its perilous adolescence its survival is assured. Rather, as 
constitutions age they are threatened by a different risk. In early periods, perhaps the most 
important risk is that parties will make insufficient investments in the new constitutional order or 
will even defect. As Part II argued, rigidity provides one solution to these risks. But in later 
periods, the risk of defection or a failure of national institutions for want of buy-in will likely 
                                                 
297 Cf. JERVIS, supra note 286, at 156 (“Looking back at a pattern, we may overestimate the degree of determinism 
involved.”). 
298 ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 120 (noting that mortality risk for constitutions peaks at age 
seventeen). 
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have diminished as parties become more entangled in a constitution-specific ecosystem of 
national institutions. In those later periods, perhaps the most important threat to constitutional 
survival is likely to emerge from the failure to adapt to changing social, economic, and 
geostrategic circumstances, or to respond to exogenous shocks such as economic crises, military 
confrontations, or natural disasters. Further, claims by constituencies originally excluded from 
the constitutional bargain may become more pressing—the cases of African-Americans and 
women are obvious examples from the American context—and hence more destabilizing with 
time.299 All else being equal, the case for adaption in the face of this second variety of risk grows 
over time. Political status quos at the time of ratification are unlikely to persist. The probability 
of salient exogenous shocks compounds over time. A constitution that cannot adapt to 
industrialization, geostrategic shocks, or new kinds of security threats is not a constitution that 
will long persist. Just as the risk of hold-ups and suboptimal investments diminishes, so the cost 
of constitutional inflexibility rises. Rather than insufficient rigidity, the problem then becomes 
one of too much inflexibility. 
 
This analysis has consequences for the optimal level of constitutional rigidity. It suggests 
an optimal constitutional amendment rule (at least in the American constitutional order) may 
well not be static but may instead be temporally sensitive. The constitution should be 
characterized by high barriers to change in the early decades of a nation, followed by a sharp 
decline in those barriers as exogenous pressures on the nation-state accumulate. Accordingly, the 
Framers can be faulted not for being countermajoritarian, but for not including a two-speed 
amendatory process in their Constitution: rigid like Article V for the first few decades to absorb 
the shocks of adolescence, but then switching to the malleable thereafter so as to adapt to new 
exogenous strains and shocks of a nation’s maturity. Note that it is no response to say that multi-
speed amendment rules are hard to draft. Article V already imposes differentially higher barriers 
to textual amendments that concern either the slave trade or certain elements of state 
sovereignty.300 So the Framers had on hand drafting solutions. They just did not use them. 
 
The problem with Article V, then, is not that it yields too rigid a constitutional text. The 
problem is rather that it has yielded too rigid a constitution for too long. What worked in the 
early Republic to address the peril of hold-up became increasingly dysfunctional in the fluid 
economic and geopolitical contexts of the late nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries.  
 
Nevertheless, it may be that Americans did create a multi-speed amendatory process that 
addressed the risk of hold-up in the Constitution’s early days, but also addressed the risk of 
failing to adapt to exogenous shocks in later periods. Americans did this, I suggest, by slowly 
developing extratextual tools for amendment of the Constitution through statutes or via judicial 
                                                 
299 Schwartzberg, supra note 38, at 74–75 (making this point in respect to the Equal Rights Amendment). 
Schwartzberg’s insightful work is a normative critique of supermajority rules. My project, by contrast, is not 
normative, but concerned with ways in which constitutional design elicits stability in the teeth of certain 
distributions of political power and strategic behavior. Whereas she frames the claims of excluded constituencies as 
a matter of justice, I treat them here merely descriptively as extrinsic constraints on constitutional survival.  
300 An interesting parallel can be drawn with syndicated credit facilities, which use a plurality of voting rules for 
distinct contractual questions in the context of long-term multi-party contracts. See Steven Miller, A Syndicated 
Loan Primer 21 (Sept. 2006), available at 
http://snde.rutgers.edu/Rutgers/Econ394/Unit3/sp_syndicated_loan_primer.pdf (discussing use of different voting 
rules). 
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decisions. These tools came to be to address the risk of non-adaption in later periods after textual 
rigidity had ceased to be of large value. From this perspective, it is possible to posit two discrete 
periods in American constitutional development: the first dominated by durability, and the 
second characterized by fluidity and change. Alternatively, the urge toward rigid periodization 
might be resisted in favor of a more nuanced vision of a constitution subject to a gradually 
changing amendment rate—i.e., one that evolved solely with the emergence of new extratextual 
methods of interpretation such as judicial review, super-statutes, and constitutional moments. 
Whether one adopts the position that our Constitution had a two-speech history, or cast 
constitutional rigidity as a continuous variable subject to incremental change, the central point I 
wish to emphasize here is the sheer fact of change over time in the de facto amendment role, and, 
consequently, the rate of institutional development.  
 
Viewing American constitutional history in this light yields some reason to cease fretting 
so much about the legitimacy of judicial review as a channel of constitutional change.301 The 
Framers may not have perceived the wisdom of a multi-speed amendatory process that 
distinguished between different moments in the post-ratification period. But successive 
generations of federal politicians and voters have intuited the value of ratcheting up the quantum 
of fluidity in their constitutional order as the principal threat to that order evolved. Over time, 
they have invented, and come to accept as legitimate, an increasing range of mechanisms for 
extra-textual constitutional change, ranging from bisectional compromises to landmark statutes 
to judicial review. All are means to adapt the 1787 settlement to new stresses, new challenges, 
and new realities.302 All are also products of subconstitutional institutions—e.g., the network of 
federal courts and a legislature operating in a robust national public sphere—that were rendered 
feasible by Article V-induced rigidity. The increasing plurality and inventiveness observed in 
any comprehensive study of the mechanisms of American constitutional change, that is, 
demonstrates that Article V enabled the creation of instruments of constitutional change that 
could supersede the text’s monopoly on constitutional change. That increasing heterogeneity of 
amendment mechanisms, moreover, illuminates the wisdom of Americans over time, who, 
having secured the benefits of Article V-induced rigidity, then felt a need for more fluidity in the 
constitutional order and found ways to bring it about notwithstanding the barriers imposed by 
Article V itself.  
 
The potentially dire counterfactual to this story of institutional evolution merits emphasis. 
Had politicians and citizens not grasped the value of extra-textual mechanisms for inducing 
constitutional change, the risk of constitutional death due to the failure to adapt to evolving 
circumstances would likely have destabilized the Constitution. Industrialization, globalization of 
trade, growing military conflict, and endogenous social change all imposed unanticipated strains 
on the constitutional order. Hewing literal-mindedly to the putative originalist rules, say, for 
congressional power and executive discretion would likely have invited national calamity and 
constitutional failure. Just as the naked claim that Article V is countermajoritarian fails to 
                                                 
301 For examples of worries about judicial review, see, e.g., Raoul Berger, Lawrence Church on the Scope of Judicial 
Review and Original Intention, 70 N.C. L. REV. 113, 132-33 (1991) (“Cumbersomeness affords no dispensation to 
the judiciary to ignore the Article V reservation of amendment to the people.” (quotation marks omitted)). For a 
more recent, and more subtle, version is the same argument, arguing that a judicial refusal to overrule earlier 
incorrect precedent constitutes an illegal entrenchment of constitutional change, see Jonathan Mitchell, Stare Decisis 
and Constitutional Text, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1, 20 (2011). 
302 See, supra Part I.B.2 (canvassing modes of extratextual amendment). 
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account for the appropriate baseline comparator, so broad condemnations of post-ratification, 
extra-textual technologies of constitutional change are also implausible in the absence of a 
plausible benchmark. Rather than comparing the present state of affairs against a utopian vision 
without those extra-textual modalities of constitutional change, critics should contrast the 
observed status quo to a world in which the Constitution has failed due to exogenous economic, 
military, or geopolitical strains.  
  
On this view, the incremental discovery and adoption of extra-textual complements to 
Article V should be celebrated and not regretted. In the early Republic, Article V provided a 
robust means to respond to contested judicial decision such as Chisolm v. Georgia303 and to fix a 
defective presidential selection mechanism.304 In that era, textual rigidity was the more valuable 
default rule. As the Republic matured, the pressure for fundamental change compounded from 
year by year.305 At some point, the need for constitutional change outran the ability of national 
political institutions to provide it through Article V procedures. Had the Court (abetted by the 
White House and Congress) not increasingly assumed an assertive role in constitutional affairs 
after a century of relative quiescence,306 it is possible that external pressures would have inflicted 
considerable damage, eventually even a fatal blow, to the Constitution. In that light, the 
emergence of increasingly robust judicial review simply responded to the increasing need for 
extra-textual vehicles of constitutional change without which the Constitution may well not have 
survived.307 Similarly, Congress’s ability and willingness to fashion statutory schemes that 
refashioned fundamental elements of the constitutional order can be seen as a necessary form of 
innovation given the fact of Article V’s sheer obduracy. Even if not all ensuing changes to the 
constitutional order were welfare-enhancing, it is quite plausible to think that in net these 
mechanisms were beneficial. Viewed from this perspective, the overwriting of the 1787 
constitution with novel and extra-textual mechanisms for constitutional change through the 
federal courts seems less a problem and more a solution to the more important design flaw in the 
text of Article V—it’s failure to specify a generally applicable dual-speed amendment regime.308 
 
In short, ours is (at least) a two-speed Constitution. Its shifting amendatory regime, while 
not embodied in text, may have provided solutions to quite different threats to constitutional 
survival (i.e., the hold-up problem and the failure-to-adapt problem) in the different periods in 
which those threats obtained. Rather than illicit substitutes for Article V, now common 
mechanisms of extra-textual constitutional change are better understood as Article V’s 
                                                 
303 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by U.S. Const. amend. XI. 
304 See U.S. Const. amend. XII. 
305 Some commentators have argued that the growth in the sheer number of federal legislators also made it harder to 
assemble the necessary supermajoritarian coalitions for constitutional change. Dixon, Partial Constitutional 
Amendments, supra note 1, at 651–64. This argument is at least in tension with the fact that the Progressive era 
featured a spate of constitutional amendments in quick succession.  
306 Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review? Schooner Peggy and the Early Marshall Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 
221, 224 (1998) (explaining how Marshall would “preserve judicial power by asserting its existence, thus 
establishing precedents for future use, while not actually attempting to challenge executive or legislative authority in 
any controversial way”).  
307 See Huq, Judicial Self-Restraint, supra note 77, at 586 (fig. 1). The arc is reflected in the first and last chapter 
headings of Lucas Powe’s history of the Court—“Very Modest Beginnings” and “An Imperial Court.” LUCAS A. 
POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE 1789-2008, at 1, 312 (2009). 
308 I do not mean here to intimate any Whiggish air of inevitability about this development.  
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complements—and its legacies. What some have construed as constitutional infidelity,309 in 
other words, in fact has been part of our Constitution’s saving grace.310 
C. Rethinking “Historical Gloss” 
 
Just as the analysis presented in this Article might provoke rethinking of the merits of 
judicial review in the abstract, it also might promote a reconsideration of some of the retail tools 
employed within constitutional interpretation. I develop in this final section a suggestive 
example. It involves the link between textual rigidity and constitutional survival in relation to the 
interpretative deployment of what Justice Frankfurter called “systemic, unbroken executive 
practice … as a gloss” on the Constitution.311 Following Justice Frankfurter’s lead, the Court 
tends to rely on historical practice especially in foreign affairs and separation of powers cases.312 
Despite the Court’s long usage of historical practice as a gloss on constitutional text, concerns 
linger about whether interbranch acquiescence, long assumed to be a touchstone for reliance 
upon historical practice, indeed supplies the appropriate guide of what evidence is salient to 
constitutional interpretation.313  
 
Judicial employment of historical gloss raises a host of important and interesting 
issues.314 This Article’s analysis of Article V simply suggests one dimension along which the 
salience of historical practice might be assessed, a dimension that to date has received little 
attention. Specifically, it suggests that historical practice ought to matter if it emerged in the first 
                                                 
309 See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 111 (1999) (focusing on “popular sovereign” as expressed in the ratification process as the 
basis of constitutional obligation).  Sophisticated originalists such as Whittington rely not only on the Founding as a 
font of popular legitimimation, but also insist on a notion of “potential sovereignty” whereby the Constitution is 
binding today before it preserves te ability of the people in the future to make new higher law. Id. at 129, 156 (“By 
maintaining the principle that constitutional meaning is determined by its authors, originalism provides the basis for 
future constitutional deliberation by the people. Present and future generations can only expect their own 
constitutional will to be effectuated if they are willing to give effect to prior such expressions.”).  Theories of 
potential sovereignty, however, fail to account for the fact of constitutional obduracy, let alone the possibility—
developed in this Article—that such obduracy is itself a precondition to constitutional survival. In this way, 
originalism may be at war with the factually necessary predicates of contined constitutional survival.   
310 It is worth noting that the solution adopted in these later periods—extratextual amendment through courts or 
superstatutes—has no precise parallel in the private contracting literature. The closest parallel I can conjure—and it 
is quite imprecise and unsatisfying—is the cramdown provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 
§1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), by which some parties to a deal can force other parties to accept changes dictated by emergent 
circumstances. The difference in the constitutional context, of course, is that there are no prespecified rules for such 
change, and that an extratextual amendment is often the result of brute political force being applied, not the 
application of a legal rule.  
311 Youngstown Sheet & Steel Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring ). 
312 For foreign affairs cases, see, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (relying on “historical 
glosses” on executive power); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (citing Youngstown). For 
separation of powers cases, see Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997) (citing the absence of historical practice as 
one ground for denying congressional standing); Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of 
Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109 (1984).  
313 See generally Curtis Bradley & Trevor Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 441 (2012) (offering an account and a partial critique of the use of historical gloss). 
314 Id.; see also Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 75, 81 (2013), 
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/forvol126_lacroix.pdf  (exploring interaction of interpretive 
methodological choice and the use of historical gloss).  
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few decades of constitutional history, but perhaps less so otherwise. Institutions and practices 
established in the immediate wake of ratification played a role in stabilizing the Constitution 
through the virtuous-circle mechanism. Hence, they are plausibly viewed as but-for causes of the 
Constitution’s longevity, entitled to positive presumptions of constitutional validity.  
 
Consistent with this view, the Supreme Court has viewed both parties and the central 
bank as constitutionally authorized. This not only means, for example, that outr two national 
political parties are not condemned in the jurisprudence as a species of refractory faction that 
Madison would have condemned. It also entails that the Supreme Court has suggested that 
electoral regulations limiting third-party competition at the polls are valid in light of the state’s 
legitimate interest in protecting the two-party system.315 The consequences of state limitations on 
the associational rights of third parties with an eye to protecting incumbent parties for democratic 
contestation have prompted much criticism of that doctrine.316 The Court’s solicitude for 
bipartisan competition, however, may be recast as defending its contribution during the early 
Republic to the stabilization of the new constitutional order.  
 
Along similar lines, it can be argued that Chief Justice Marshall was justified in 
sustaining the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States in M’Culloch v. Maryland 
despite considerable popular resistance by saying that “all branches of the government have … 
been acting on the existence of this power, nearly thirty years, it would seem almost too late to 
call it in question, unless its repugnancy with the constitution were plain and manifest.”317 The 
Bank, as one of the pivotal anchors of the 1787 constitutional disposition, had earned its 
legality.318 Indeed, even its early for Madison recognized as much by 1816.319 In contrast, this 
theory of path dependent institutional development provides no support for the legtimating 
invocation of historical practices that emerged long after the early Republican period. Hence, the 
Court’s reluctant to attribute significance to post-New Deal congressional use of the legislative 
veto in a case invalidating such devices may have a justification beyond the reasons offered by 
the Court.320 
 
The link between textual rigidity and constitutional survival thus points toward a 
temporally sensitive account of how historical practice should be employed in constitutional 
                                                 
315 See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 353-54, 367 (1997) (upholding restrictions on 
“fusion” candidates, and noting that states can enact election regulations that “in practice, favor the traditional two-
party system”); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-96 (1986) (upholding primary qualification 
requirements for third party candidates to appear on the general election ballot); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729-
30, 736 (1974) (upholding restrictions on independent candidates for office, and affirming that states can take 
measures to prevent “unrestrained factionalism”). 
316 For criticisms in the wake of Timmons, see Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court 
Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. 
REV. 331 (1997). 
317 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 323 (1819). 
318 See David A. Strauss, Not Unwritten, After All?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1538 (2013) (discussing the way in 
which the first Bank garnered legitimacy through early practice). 
319 See James Madison, On the Grant of the Charter of 1816 (Apr. 4-5, 1816), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE AND 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 707, 713 (M. St. Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall eds., 
1832). 
320 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (noting historical practice). The Court there 
also cited evidence of presidential nonacquiesence. Id. at 942 n.13.  
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interpretation. That approach would be consistent not only with extant case law, but also in 
harmony with James Madison’s assertion in the Federalist Papers that constitutional meaning 
would be “liquidated and ascertained” through the initial practice of federal politicians in the 
early Republic.321 Those early years of the Republic were indeed pivotal—but not for reasons 
that Madison predicted or perceived. 
Conclusion 
 
 Article V has long occasioned embarrassment and evasion. But the textual rigidity it 
fostered should be celebrated as having been pivotal to the Constitution’s survival during the 
parlous, storm-tossed days of the early Republic. Without the benefit of a sophisticated 
understanding of transaction-cost economics, the Framers chanced on an effective solution to the 
problem of constitutional hold-ups, which likely deepened the prospect of constitutional survival 
through the tempestuous first decades of the Constitution’s life. Sometimes, it appears, being 
lucky is as valuable as being wise.  
 
This Article has focused on explaining and defending textual rigidity’s function in the 
early Republic. But the fact of the Constitution’s survival through to the present day is testimony 
not merely to the virtues of textual rigidity—which responded solely to early-stage threats to 
constitution survival—but also to later institutional innovations by politicians and judges in 
conjuring extra-textual complements to Article V. These facilitated adjustment to exogenous 
shocks and evolving social, economic and political circumstances. The interaction between 
Article V and these extra-textual modalities of constitutional change, I have suggested, is more 
complex than the stark, binary incompatibility between constitutional fidelity and judicial license 
that is often posited. Rather than competitors, Article V and its extra-textual analogs are partial 
complements. As much as it calls for reconsideration of Article V, in sum, this Article invites a 
rethinking of the subtle and ever-shifting relationship between the diverse textual, judicial, and 
political modes of constitutional change invented across the decades and centuries by our 
fortunate, ingenuous, and oddly long-lived nation. 
                                                 
321 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 245 (J. Madison) (I. Kramnick, ed. 1987). The Court has applied this dictum, for 
example, in respect to removal power questions. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926) (“[A] 
contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution, when the founders of our government and framers of 
our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the 
construction to be given to its provisions.”). But see Huq. Removal, supra note 82, at 12 & n.48 (questioning 
Myers’s historical account and logic).  
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